Fetal Personhood and the Constitution

By John A. Robertson

The Rubio-Huckabee claim that actual and legal personhood start at conception has drawn trenchant responses from Art Caplan on the medical uncertainty of such a claim and David Orentlicher, drawing on Judith Thomson’s famous article, that even if a fetus is a person, woman would not necessarily have a duty to keep it in her body.

Their debate claim that the fetus is already a legal person under the constitution also deserves a response, for it has no basis in positive law.  In Roe v. Wade all nine justices agreed that the use of “person” in the Constitution always assumed a born person, and therefore that the 14th Amendment’s mention of person did not confer constitutional rights until after a live birth.  In the years since Roe, when the make-up of the court has changed, no justice has ever disagreed with that conclusion, including those who would overturn Roe and Casey. Read More

Bioethicist Art Caplan: Marco Rubio And The GOP’s Dangerous Misconception On When Life Begins

Bill of Health Contributor Art Caplan has a new piece up on Forbes:

Does human life begin at conception? For Marco Rubio and some other politicians now running for the presidential nomination in the GOP herd, the answer is yes. There is no doubt in their mind about when life begins. Amazingly despite indifference to science regarding other matters like evolution and climate change, they invoke science on behalf of their advocacy of what might best be called “conceptionalism.” And given what science shows the law must protect every new life.

Those lobbying for conceptionalism aim to outlaw all abortions, no matter how an embryo is conceived. Even if a mentally ill 12-year-old woman is raped by her predatory father, killing an embryo, if one results, ought not be a legal option in their view. When life begins at conception murder is never an option, Rubio and his fellow-travelers aver. [..]

Read the full article here.

Bioethicist Art Caplan: All Hat, No Cattle—The False Hope of Right-to-Try Laws

Bill of Health contributor Arthur Caplan and Alison Bateman-House have a new piece up in Harvard Health Policy Review:

Are right-to-try laws a good idea? In 2014, they began appearing throughout the United States, first in Colorado and now in 23 states, with several more considering passing versions of this popular legislation.

At first glance these bills may seem worth enacting. Right-to-try (RTT) laws promise terminally ill patients that they can obtain experimental drugs or medical devices in their quests to save or extend their lives. These investigational medical products are still in development and have not yet met the requirements set by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in order to be approved for sale or use in the United States. In some cases, the products are still being tested and patient access would primarily be by enrolling in a clinical trial – something terminally ill people may be too unwell to do. Less commonly, the products have completed clinical testing and are waiting for an approval verdict from the FDA. In either case, RTT laws are about providing terminally ill patients access to unapproved drugs or devices. […]

Read the full article here.

Journal of Law and the Biosciences: Call for Harvard Student Submissions

JLB coverThe Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics at Harvard Law School collaborates with Stanford and Duke Universities to publish the Journal of Law and Biosciences  (Oxford University Press), an online, open-access, peer-reviewed journal. JLB includes a Notes & Developments section, comprised  of  brief summaries and commentary on recent legislation, regulation, and case law written by graduate students at the collaborating schools. The Petrie­Flom Center is responsible for providing the Notes & Developments for one issue per annual volume.

We are currently seeking Harvard graduate students to contribute papers to be published in JLB’s Notes & Developments section in early 2016. In previous years, Notes & Developments have been generated from scratch specifically for JLB, based on selection from submitted proposals. This year, we are taking a different approach by publishing already complete (or to-be-completed by the deadline) original student papers (such as student notes, course papers, etc.) written by graduate students from any Harvard school.  Notes & Developments are limited to 5000 words, including footnotes and references,  and  should  be  on  a  topic  of  relevance  to  law  and  the  biosciences,  in particular a topic of relatively recent concern, controversy, or change. They should focus on  describing  the  issue  at  hand,  explaining  why  it  is  relevant to scholars and practitioners, and providing analysis and questions for further consideration.

Interested students should submit their papers and CVs for consideration no later than September 7, 2015 (earlier  is  welcome). Up to four papers will be selected for publication in the New Developments section of JLB. Applicants will be notified by the end of September. Selected students will receive comments on their papers by the end of October, and will also be responsible for providing comments to the other selected students. Revisions will be due by the end of November, and final submissions to JLB will be due by the end of December 2015.

Please send all application materials, and direct all questions, to Holly Fernandez Lynch, hlynch@law.harvard.edu.

Affective Forecasting and Genetics

by Zachary Shapiro

Psychological research on “affective forecasting,” studying individuals’ ability to predict their future emotional states, consistently shows that people are terrible at predicting their ability to adapt to future adversity. This finding has particular significance for medical decision-making, as so many serious health decisions hinge on quality-of-life judgments, generally made by an individual balancing risks and benefits they perceive of a future state that is likely to result from a given therapeutic regime.

Much of the research on affective forecasting has focused on high-stakes events, restricting study participation to those likely to find the study event particularly significant, such as tenure-track faculty, registered voters, or sports enthusiasts. Despite a growing body of research on forecasting biases in the medical domain, little work has previously systematically considered such biases in clinical genetics. However, as the prevalence of genetic testing has increased, scholars have noticed forecasting deficiencies with increasing regularity.[1]

While evidence suggests that those who receive genetic testing, whether they are non-carriers or carriers of specific genes, differ in terms of short-term general psychological distress, their long-term distress levels do not differ significantly. Results of research into the affective reactions of patients undergoing predictive genetic testing suggest that, in general, psychological outcomes are not as negative as one may expect.

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Bureaucracy Can Save Lives – The Legacy of Dr. Frances Kelsey

By Robert Field

What adjective would most people associate with the word “bureaucrat”? For many, it would be “inefficient,” “inept,” or “incompetent.” But another that is just as descriptive is “lifesaving.”

Dr. Frances Kelsey, who died this month at the age of 101, was celebrated as an American hero for her work as a medical officer at the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). She saved thousands of lives and prevented untold suffering by using techniques that earn bureaucrats a bad name, delay and obstruction, to keep the drug thalidomide from reaching the market in the United States in 1961.

Thalidomide is a sedative that had been approved for sale in Europe four years earlier and was prescribed for morning sickness during pregnancy. The American manufacturer, Richardson-Merrell, saw a large potential market in the United States. However, Dr. Kelsey, who was assigned to review its application for marketing approval, was troubled by questionable safety data. The law in effect in 1961 required that she issue a decision within 60 days, but she was able to buy more time by asking for additional information.

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Interpreting Fiorina’s Comments on Vaccination Law

By Michelle Meyer

I’ve started writing for Forbes as a regular contributor. My first piece, Carly Fiorina Says Her Views On Vaccines Are Unremarkable; For Better Or Worse, She’s Right, analyzes GOP presidential candidate Carly Fiorina’s recent ad hoc remarks on the relative rights of parents and schools with respect to vaccinations and to some of the hyperbolic reactions to those remarks. Fiorina’s remarks are ambiguous, in ways that I discuss. But, as the title of the article suggests, and for better or worse, I think that the best interpretation of them places her stance squarely in the mainstream of current U.S. vaccination law. I end with a call for minimally charitable interpretations of others’ views, especially on contentious issues like vaccination.

A Very Special ‘The Week in Health Law’ Podcast

By Nicolas Terry

twihl 14x14

TWIHL presents its first Back to School Special. We asked some wonderful health lawyers what were the compelling additions to this Fall’s health law curriculum. The answers are diverse and fascinating. To hear their explanations look for episode 22 when you subscribe at iTunes, listen at Stitcher RadioTunein and Podbean, or search for The Week in Health Law in your favorite podcast app.

We are extremely grateful to the following (with links to their recommended topics):
Micah Berman – PBS Unnatural Causes
Erin Fuse Brown – Physician Self-Referral Updates (STARK)
Glenn Cohen – Egg freezing and egg banking: empowerment and alienation in assisted reproduction
Brietta Clark – Pickup v. Brown
Nicole Huberfeld – Armstrong v Exceptional Child Center Inc. 
Elizabeth Weeks Leonard – King v. Burwell
Frank Pasquale – Narrow Networks
Ross Silverman – Should childhood vaccination against measles be a mandatory requirement for attending school? Yes
Norman G. Tabler, Jr.–  Can an Arbitrator Rule Against a Hospital for Not Violating the Anti-Kickback Statute?
Nicolas Terry – North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission

The Week in Health Law Podcast from Frank Pasquale and Nicolas Terry is a commuting-length discussion about some of the more thorny issues in Health Law & Policy.

Show notes and more are at TWIHL.com. If you have comments, an idea for a show or a topic to discuss you can find us on twitter @nicolasterry @FrankPasquale @WeekInHealthLaw

Akamai v. Limelight: Implications for Medical Method Patents (Redux)

By Rachel Sachs

Yesterday, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit issued a unanimous en banc ruling in Akamai v. Limelight, altering the reach of patent liability for induced infringement of a method claim under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).  This is the second time the en banc court has considered Akamai.  Three years ago, in a splintered decision, a majority of the court had ruled that liability for induced infringement was possible where no single entity had performed all the steps of a claim, but where those steps were divided between two or more parties, one of whom had induced the other(s) to infringe.  In 2014, the Supreme Court reversed, essentially reinstating this single entity rule, and after a panel opinion largely adopting the Supreme Court’s reasoning, a unanimous en banc court has now broadened – at least somewhat – the scope of divided infringement liability, relative to the Supreme Court’s decision.

More specifically, the Federal Circuit concluded that an entity may be held liable for others’ performance of steps of a method claim “in two sets of circumstances: (1) where that entity directs or controls others’ performance, and (2) where the actors form a joint enterprise.”  Noting the court’s prior holdings that these circumstances are met where there is an agency relationship between the relevant actors or there are explicit contractual duties to perform the steps of the method claims, the en banc court added another such circumstance in which liability may be found: “when an alleged infringer conditions participation in an activity or receipt of a benefit upon performance of a step or steps of a patented method and establishes the manner or timing of that performance.”  Because this third condition was present in the case under consideration, the Federal Circuit deemed Limelight liable for infringement.

Exactly thirteen months ago, after the Supreme Court’s decision but before the Federal Circuit had considered the case on remand, I had blogged here about the case’s potential implications for diagnostic method patents.  (For those interested in this field, I then wrote a longer article about diagnostic technologies more broadly, which features a more detailed explanation of this issue.) Essentially, my argument was that the increasing restrictions the courts have placed on patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 would interact with these new divided infringement rules.

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Clarity for an “Unforgiving” and “Potentially Unworkable” Rule

By Zack Buck

In a case previously blogged about here, last week, the Southern District of New York denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss in U.S. ex rel. Kane v. Continuum Health Partners, No. 11-2325, in a major decision for health care entities unclear on the parameters of overpayment liability under the False Claims Act (FCA).

The case centers on Continuum Health Partners, Inc. (Continuum)—which operated three New York City area hospitals—and its erroneous receipt of overpayments from the New York Medicaid program based on a software glitch. The overpayments began in 2009; by September 2010, the New York State Comptroller had notified Continuum. Continuum tapped Robert Kane, an employee, to review the billing data and identify all claims that were incorrect. On February 4, 2011, Kane emailed a spreadsheet to superiors that contained 900 claims that may have been erroneously billed. The spreadsheet was “overly inclusive” and “approximately half of the claims listed therein were never actually overpaid.” On February 8, Kane was terminated.

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