Big Data, Genetics, and Re-Identification

by Zachary Shapiro

While all scientific research produces data, genomic analysis is somewhat unique in that it inherently produces vast quantities of data. Every human genome contains roughly 20,000-25,000 genes, so that even the most routine genomic sequencing or mapping will generate enormous amounts of data. Furthermore, next-generation sequencing techniques are being pioneered to allow researchers to quickly sequence genomes. These advances have resulted in both a dramatic reduction in the time needed to sequence a given genome, while also triggering a substantial reduction in cost. Along with novel methods of sequencing genomes, there have been improvements in storing and sharing genomic data, particularly using computer and internet based databases, giving rise to Big Data in the field of genetics.

While big data has proven useful for genomic research, there is a possibility that the aggregation of so much data could give rise to new ethical concerns. One concern is that promises of privacy made to individual participants might be undermined, if there exists a possibility of subject re-identification.

Re-identification of individual participants, from de-identified data contained in genetic databases, can occur when researchers apply unique algorithms that are able to cross-reference numerous data sets with the available genetic information. This can enable diligent researchers to re-identify specific individuals, even from data sets that are thought to be anonymized. Such re-identification represents a genuine threat to the privacy of the individual, as a researcher could learn about genetic risk factors for diseases, or other sensitive health and personal information, from combing through an individual’s genetic information.

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Medicaid Is Not a Welfare Program

By Michael Anne Kyle

Medicaid is often thought of as a welfare program because of the essential role it plays in providing health insurance for low-income people. However, looks can be deceiving. In terms of scale and scope, Medicaid is rapidly becoming a powerhouse player in health care.

Medicaid enrollment is booming as a result of the Affordable Care Act (ACA): nearly 72 million people are enrolled in Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). To put this in perspective, about 55 million people are enrolled in Medicare and about 64 million in the UK’s NHS. Medicaid enrollment is likely to continue rising as more states contemplate expansion. As of this month, 30 states and the District of Columbia have expanded Medicaid under the ACA.

Size isn’t the only way Medicaid is changing. Unlike Medicare, Medicaid is a joint state and federal program, which means that states have a lot of latitude to innovate with both delivery and payment. The ACA has enhanced opportunity for reform through planned initiatives like the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI), and unexpected pathways, like negotiations around Medicaid expansion – these have yielded some of the most radical departures from the traditional public program paradigm, even in states that have not sought a “private option

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The Public Health Law Research program is hiring legal research associates to work on our policy surveillance project. The legal research associate will conduct legal research using Lexis and Westlaw, build historical law using HeinOnline, and conceptualize legal domains for empirical research. The associate will also code law for the creation of quantitative legal datasets at LawAtlas.org, and write legal briefs and other materials for LawAtlas.org.

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Assisted Suicide and Lethal Injection: FDA’s Regulatory Dilemma?

By Elizabeth Guo

Two weeks ago, California’s legislature approved a bill that would make California the fifth, and largest state to approve assisted suicide. If Governor Jerry Brown signs the bill, California would join Oregon, Washington, Montana, and Vermont in permitting physicians to prescribe life-ending medications. California was one of 36 states that considered assisted suicide legislation this year. Though none of the bills have become law, the assisted suicide, or “Death with Dignity” movement seems to be gaining strength.

If assisted suicide becomes legal in California, whether and how patients will have access to assisted suicide is a different matter. Secobarbitol and pentobarbital are the most commonly used medications in assisted suicide. Pentobarbital, the cheaper of the two options and the preferred drug of choice, is facing a drug shortage. Pentobarbital is also used in capital punishment, and U.S. suppliers have stopped producing the drug because the suppliers did not want to be associated with lethal injection. The drug shortage has left some patients considering assisted suicide to go through back alleyways to obtain pentobarbital.

Indeed, the Death with Dignity movement is facing many of the same issues that state corrections agencies are facing in obtaining access to lethal drugs. None of the drugs used for assisted suicide or lethal injection are FDA-approved for a lethal purpose. Both groups have faced challenges in importing the drugs from other countries because FDA cannot accepting an imported drug if it appears to violate Food Drug and Cosmetic Act. Both groups have, in some cases, resorted to compounding pharmacies to manufacture lethal drugs from raw materials.

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What’s the Difference Between Anorexia Nervosa and Hunger Strike?

My last post presented the debate over force feeding hunger striking prisoners in Israel. This post will discuss another group subjected to the dramatic means of force feeding in extreme circumstances, Anorexia Nervosa patients (AN).

Although ethical justifications for force-feeding are similar for both Anorexics and Hunger strikers (save life), the legal framework is completely different in each context. Whereas hunger striking prisoners were dealt with via ad-hoc legislation meant to answer national security threats, AN patients are handled within the framework of mental health law.  In the U.S., compulsory hospitalization of mental patients occurs through the state’s Civil Commitment Laws, which require dangerousness resulting from a mental illness to be evaluated by a psychiatrist.

Is the different legal attitude justified? How is it that the same act performed by prisoners is viewed as a political assertion but when done predominantly by adolescent middle-upper class girls, it is considered mental illness?

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RFRA Jumps The Shark: The 8th Circuit Strikes Down the Contraception Accommodation (Part 2)

Lego_SharkJump
Flickr/Creative Commons – Bill Ward

By Gregory M. Lipper

Thomas Jefferson famously said that “[i]t does me no injury for my neighbour to say there are twenty gods, or no god. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.” Note what Jefferson did not say: “my neighbor is entitled to pick my pocket and break my leg, so long as the government can refill my pocket and pay for a cast on my leg.”

But the latter formulation seemed to influence last week’s Eighth Circuit ruling that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) bars the government from implementing an accommodation for employers with religious objections to including contraception in their health plans. In my previous post, I explained why the Eighth Circuit reduced RFRA’s substantial-burden requirement to a mere formality, potentially subjecting any and every federal law or regulation to strict scrutiny. Once things get to strict scrutiny, the Eighth Circuit goes even further, suggesting that a federal regulation cannot be sustained if the government could, in theory, provide the benefit or service itself.

The Eighth Circuit first applied this approach to the process by which employers obtain the religious exemption. Under the current rules, an objecting organization need only send a written notice to the government and identify its insurance provider or third-party administrator; the government then works with the insurance provider or third-party administrator to arrange for the employees to receive the contraceptive coverage to which they are entitled by law.

The Eighth Circuit, however, reasoned that there is a less-restrictive alternative to requiring this information, since the government could identify the necessary insurance providers and third-party administrators on its own—well, maybe: “Even if the [third-party administrators] are not known, the government has not shown at this stage of the proceedings that the inconvenience of identifying the [third-party administrators] likely would create an administrative problem of sufficient magnitude to make its entire scheme unworkable.” According to the Eighth Circuit, then, no disclosure requirement can be sustained unless the government can prove that it would be unable to discover the information after its own investigation.

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Generic Drug Price Increases: Implications for Medicaid

By Rachel Sachs

The internet (not just the health policy part of the internet!) is fascinated by today’s New York Times story about dramatic recent increases in the costs of many decades-old drugs.  The story focuses on the case of Daraprim, the standard of care for treating the parasitic infection toxoplasmosis.  Daraprim was recently acquired by a start-up, which then raised the drug’s price from $13.50 a pill to $750 a pill.  Daraprim has been around for decades, and as the story notes, it’s just one of many recent examples of dramatic price increases for generic drugs, often after their acquisition by other companies (as in this case).

The article raises an enormous number of issues of interest to intellectual property and health policy scholars, both explicitly and implicitly, and other commentators have begun to canvass them.  But I want to spend the rest of this blog post unpacking a single point made in the article, because it actually contains an enormous amount of complexity.  As the author notes, “[the company’s] price increase could bring sales to tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars a year if use remains constant. Medicaid and certain hospitals will be able to get the drug inexpensively under federal rules for discounts and rebates. But private insurers, Medicare and hospitalized patients would have to pay an amount closer to the list price.”

The author is right that there’s one sense in which Medicaid and entities eligible for the 340B program (I assume this is what the author is referring to when he says “certain hospitals”) will be able to obtain this drug “inexpensively” – but there’s another sense in which they won’t be able to.

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How Privacy Law Affects Medical and Scientific Research

[Cross-posted from the Genomics Law Report blog]

By John Conley

Over the last five or so years my law practice has focused increasingly on privacy law, both domestic and international. In hindsight, this was a predictable outcome: as an intellectual property lawyer, many of my clients do business on the Internet or are engaged in scientific research and development, with many of the latter in the health care area. These are the very kinds of people who need to worry about privacy—of their customers, users, patients, and subjects. As they started on focusing on privacy concerns, these clients turned to their IP lawyers for help, and my Robinson Bradshaw colleagues and I have tried to stay ahead of their needs.

As a consequence of my growing privacy practice, I am regularly called on to give overviews to other lawyers as well as non-lawyers in the scientific and business communities. I thought it might be useful to devote a GLR post to a privacy law summary targeted at readers who conduct medical and other scientific research. Privacy law is a transnational mess, so this will be a bit longer than I’d like—my apologies, and please don’t shoot the messenger—but I’ll try to cut through the legal jargon.

Sources of Modern Privacy Law Read More

RFRA Jumps The Shark: The 8th Circuit Strikes Down the Contraception Accommodation (Part 1)

Flickr/Creative Commons – Bill Ward
Flickr/Creative Commons – Bill Ward

By Gregory M. Lipper

On Thursday, the Eighth Circuit all but assured that major parts of the Affordable Care Act will return to the Supreme Court’s chopping block. This time the issue is whether an accommodation—enabling religious objectors to opt out of offering contraceptive coverage to their employees—itself violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA). The Eighth Circuit ruled for the plaintiffs in Sharpe Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, along with a companion case brought by Dordt College. The court concluded that the accommodation substantially burdened plaintiffs’ religious exercise and that the accommodation was not the least-restrictive means of ensuring that the plaintiffs’ employees had contraceptive coverage.

The Eighth Circuit’s substantial-burden ruling is unprecedented. Indeed, the contraception coverage cases appear to be the first time that exempted entities have sued to prevent the government from implementing a religious exemption. Like the other nonprofit organizations challenging the contraception regulations, the plaintiffs in this case are not required to cover contraceptives. All they have to do is provide written notice (to either their plan administrator or the Department of Health and Human Services) that they object to providing contraceptive coverage and wish to opt out. Once they provide that notice, the government arranges for the plan administrator to arrange for contraceptive coverage—at no charge to either the plaintiffs or their employees.

The plaintiffs insist that by opting out of providing contraceptive coverage, they “indirectly provide, trigger, and facilitate that objectionable coverage through the … accommodation process.” Every other federal appeals court to have addressed these challenges—even courts as conservative as the Fifth Circuit—has rejected this argument. Indeed, the plaintiffs are being asked to do what they have already done voluntarily: state, in writing, that they object to providing contraceptive coverage to their employees. And it is the HHS regulations, not the plaintiffs’ written notice, that facilitates the provision of contraceptive coverage to plaintiffs’ employees.

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Texas, Abortion, and the Supreme Court – Part II

[cross-posted at Prawfsblawg]

By Jessie Hill

In this second post on the certiorari petition in Whole Women’s Health v. Cole, I want to consider the likelihood that the Supreme Court will take this case, and if it does, what it is likely to do with it.

I think it’s a very good bet that the Supreme Court will decide to hear this case this Term, perhaps in conjunction with one of the other cases that deals with admitting privileges laws – either Currier v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, another admitting privileges case, in which the Fifth Circuit actually enjoined an admitting-privileges requirement that would have shut down the last remaining abortion clinic in Mississippi, or Planned Parenthood v. Van Hollen, in which the Seventh Circuit enjoined an admitting-privileges law. However, both of those cases are still at the preliminary-injunction stage, unlike Whole Women’s Health, which was rushed to trial on an expedited schedule. Still, SCOTUS has been holding onto the petition in Jackson Women’s Health Organization since the spring and may well decide to consolidate it with Whole Women’s Health. (No petition has yet been filed in Van Hollen, as that case is back in front of the district court and scheduled for trial.)

There are a lot of reasons for the Court to grant cert in at least one of these cases.

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