Introducing NPRM Symposium Blogger Govind Persad

GPersad 8-23-12Govind Persad will contribute to Bill of Health’s symposium on the 2015 notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on human subjects regulations.

Govind is a postdoctoral fellow at Georgetown University and will be an Assistant Professor (beginning 2016) in the Department of Health Policy and Management and Berman Center for Bioethics at Johns Hopkins University. His research is at the intersection of political philosophy, applied ethics, and health law.

Govind has been a visiting scholar at the Department of Medical Ethics and Health Policy at the University of Pennsylvania. He holds a JD/PhD from Stanford, where he was a student fellow at Stanford’s Center on Law and Biosciences; he was a pre-doctoral fellow at the Department of Bioethics, National Institutes of Health.

Representative publications:

Should a patient have a right not to know genetic information about him or herself?

By Benjamin E. Berkman, JD, MPH

While promising to eventually revolutionize medicine, the capacity to cheaply and quickly generate an individual’s entire genome has not been without controversy.  Producing information on this scale seems to violate some of the accepted norms governing how to practice medicine, norms that evolved during the early years of genetic testing when a targeted paradigm dominated.  One of these widely accepted norms was that an individual had a right not to know (“RNTK”) genetic information about him or herself.  Prompted by evolving professional practice guidelines, the RNTK has become a highly controversial topic.  The medical community and bioethicists are actively engaged in a contentious debate about the extent to which individual choice should play a role (if at all) in determining which clinically significant findings are returned.

In a recent paper published in Genetics in Medicine, my coauthors and I provide some data that illuminates this and other issues. Our survey of 800 IRB members and staff about their views on incidental findings demonstrates how malleable views on the RNTK can be.  Respondents were first asked about the RNTK in the abstract: “Do research participants have a right not to know their own genetic information?  In other words, would it be acceptable for them to choose not to receive any GIFs?”  An overwhelming majority (96%) endorsed the right not-to-know.  But when asked about a case where a specific patient has chosen not to receive clinically beneficial incidental findings, only 35% indicated that the individual’s RNTK should definitely be respected, and 28% said that they would probably honor the request not to know.  Interestingly, the percentage of respondents who indicated that they do not support the RNTK increased from 2% at baseline to 26% when presented with the specific case.  The percentage of people who are unsure similarly jumps, from 1% to 11%.

Read More

How broad can consent be?

By Nanibaa’ A. Garrison, Ellen Wright Clayton and Ingrid A. Holm

Based on today’s publication of the paper A systematic literature review of individuals’ perspectives on broad consent and data sharing in the United States in Genetics in Medicine. 

The recent Notice of Proposed Rule Making (NPRM) issued by the Office of Human Research Protections proposes to require researchers to obtain informed consent from virtually every patient and research participant for use of biospecimens for research. The proposed regulations also permit obtaining broad consent for future uses, without any IRB oversight unless individual results are going to be returned so long as an elaborate consent form is signed. The NIH Genomic Data Sharing Policy, which went into effect earlier this year, requires almost all investigators who receive NIH funding to seek broad consent from participants to allow their data to be shared with other investigators. Thus, in a short period of time, two major policies promoted broad consent for biobank research, changes in the practice of recruiting participants for research that make us take notice. They also raise new questions, including: What do research participants think about having their biospecimens and data shared, and about giving broad consent to do so?

Who is comfortable with Broad Consent?
The Electronic Medical Records and Genomics (eMERGE) Network’s Consent, Education, Regulation, and Consultation (CERC) working group set out to find some answers. As a part of this effort, we conducted a systematic review, which revealed that males, whites, older individuals, and more affluent individuals are generally pretty comfortable with broad consent that can be found here. By contrast, Asian and African American individuals are less comfortable with broad consent. Will these different levels of concern create a divide between those who will and will not participate? The consequences of lack of participation are clear – we will know less about how genetic variation in groups that do not take part affects health and less about how to provide optimal care. Read More

Fixing the Broken Law of Military Medical Malpractice for Birth-Related Injuries

By Alex Stein and Dov Fox

Bill of Health bloggers Alex Stein and Dov Fox have just filed an amicus brief urging the Supreme Court to hear the case of U.S. Air Force Major Heather Ortiz and her baby, who were denied legal remedies for obstetric malpractice by military doctors that left the baby with severe brain damage. The case is No. 15-488 Ortiz v. U.S. ex rel. Evans Army Community Hospital. Professors Fox and Stein urge the Court to overturn the Tenth Circuit’s holding that the federal government’s immunity against liability for intramilitary torts extends to wrongful injuries like those sustained by Major Ortiz’s baby. They argue that this holding misinterprets the immunity, misapplies the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), and constitutes no less than unconstitutional sex discrimination. Fox and Stein explain:

When a civilian spouse of a serviceman receives negligent prenatal care from military doctors and delivers an injured baby as a result of that malpractice, there is no question that Feres immunity does not apply and that the baby can sue the United States under the FTCA. When military medical malpractice injures the baby of a servicewoman, this baby should be equally able to obtain redress under the FTCA.  A system that would single out the civilian children of servicewomen for adverse treatment discriminates against women who serve in the armed forces. . . To interpret the FTCA as the Tenth Circuit did permits discrimination between these two classes of similarly situated victims of military malpractice and violates fundamental principles of equal protection.

To download this brief, click here.