Month: June 2016

Trial by Fire: CRISPR takes the next step

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CRISPR-Cas9 has drawn applause for being one of the biggest technological advancements in recent history, but it also raises important ethical issues. This technology, an efficient genome editing tool, is now taking its next big step: CRISPR might be going in for human trials for its potential use in fighting cancer (namely, by altering T-cells to treat cancer cells as “foreign bodies”). Trials have been proposed to be conducted at three sites over a period of two years. The Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RAC) at the NIH gave its unanimous approval for these trials earlier this week. Now permissions from FDA and Institutional Review Boards remain before this becomes a reality.

Whether or not the studies will get that approval is uncertain. The RAC already expressed concerns about conflict of interest, and the ghosts of the trial involving Jesse Gelsinger 17 years ago at UPenn have resurfaced.  There are also important questions about risks, uncertainty, and informed consent from the research participants.

The scientific community and regulators have been wary of the gravity of the implications of genome editing. When a Chinese study involving gene editing in human embryos was submitted for publication, there was a hue and cry over whether journals should accept it, given ethical concerns. Currently, there is a moratorium on altering DNA that will subsequently pass on to new generations. Even when the CRISPR technology was approved for editing human embryos in the UK, it was mandated that embryos be destroyed within fourteen days.

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The Reproductive Rights Case the Supreme Court Decided *Not* to Decide

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By Dov Fox

The landmark abortion decision in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt eclipsed quieter reproductive rights news out of the Supreme Court at the end of its term. It involves a couple’s claim that the Tennessee Supreme Court violated their equal protection rights by refusing to recognize “disruption of family planning as either an independent cause of action or element of damages.” You won’t have heard about this case. It wasn’t a merits judgment, but a decision not to decide. The Court’s denial of certiorari in Rye v. Women’s Care Center of Memphis has gone all but unremarked. It shouldn’t. This post lays out the arguments and why the Court (most likely) declined to hear it on appeal (without explaining its decision, as standard for cert denials). My updated article out in next year’s Columbia Law Review elaborates on the significance of professional wrongdoing that imposes, deprives, and confounds procreation in the face of people’s best efforts to plan a family.

The dispute arose during Michelle Rye’s third pregnancy. Rye has Rh negative blood, meaning that she produces antibodies that attack the blood cells of a Rh-positive fetus, potentially leading to serious harm in a born child. Doctors nowadays easily prevent this Rh-sensitization by injecting the pregnant woman with a compound called RhoGAM. But Rye’s doctor didn’t give her that injection. Now the couple couldn’t have more children of their own without risking serious health problems. Their Catholic faith took fetal testing and abortion off the table. They couldn’t even use birth control to prevent a risky pregnancy. Rye and her husband sued the doctor (who admitted negligence) for disrupting their family plans. Tennessee courts, all the way up to the state’s Supreme Court, rejected their claim. The courts held that the couple had not suffered the kind of injury that would support a legal cause of action. The Ryes’ petition to the U.S Supreme Court argued that the state Court’s refusal to recognize their claim denied them equal protection under the law. Read More

Whole Woman’s Health – Some preliminary thoughts on benefits, purposes, and fetal status

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By Jonathan Will

The Supreme Court’s decision in Whole Woman’s Health is sure to be dissected in the coming days, weeks, and months.  In the meantime, I wanted to quickly reengage the discussion about the status of the “purpose prong” of Casey and what, if anything, Whole Woman’s Health tells us about it.  While Justice Breyer’s analysis in the majority opinion does not seem to be couched expressly in terms of Casey’s purpose prong, the majority’s willingness to assess the applicable laws’ benefits may ultimately be purpose dressed in different clothing.  If there is not sufficient evidence of a law’s benefit, there could be a problem.

As a quick refresher, recall that Casey prohibits laws that have either the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus.  While most folks can readily associate Casey’s “undue burden” test in terms of abortion restrictions that have the effect of placing obstacles, Priscilla Smith and Caitlin Borgmann, have written about courts seemingly ignoring Casey’s other mandate that laws should not have the purpose of even trying to place such obstacles (regardless of whether they succeed in creating that effect).  This avoidance of the purpose prong coupled with great deference to the asserted justifications of the legislature (without the kind of benefits inquiry seen in Whole Woman’s Health) has historically led to many TRAP (targeted regulation of abortion provider) laws being upheld.

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The AMA Should Forget the Dickey Amendment — For Now

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By Shailin Thomas

gunRecently, the American Medical Association (“AMA”) passed an emergency resolution at its annual conference declaring gun violence a public health crisis and calling for both restrictions on access to firearms and increased research into gun-related violence. In its announcement, the AMA noted that it plans to “actively lobby Congress to overturn legislation that for 20 years has prohibited the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) from researching gun violence.”

The AMA’s decision to publicly take a strong stance on gun violence could have a substantive impact on the national conversation. The group represents one of the most powerful voices in health care policy. According to the Sunlight Foundation, the AMA is a “political powerhouse,” raising $1.3 million through its PAC during the 2014 election cycle and spending almost $22 million on lobbying in 2015 alone. To put that in perspective, the National Rifle Association — the nation’s foremost gun rights organization — spent $3.6 million on lobbying that year. Admittedly, the AMA — unlike the NRA — is a multi-issue organization, and it remains to be seen whether it will throw its financial heft behind this new position, but the fact that there is a powerful new party at the table has made some hopeful that members of Congress will start to think more seriously about finding ways to reduce gun violence. Read More

Whole Women’s Health, First Take: On the Major Victories and On Technocratic vs. Kulturkampf Approaches to Abortion Litigation at the Supreme Court

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I have just made my way through all 107 pages of Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt,  the Supreme Court’s decision this morning to invalidate Texas’ H.B. 2 admitting privileges and surgical center regulations as undue burdens on the abortion right. Full disclosure I filed an amicus brief arguing for this result.  The case was 5-3 with Justices Thomas, Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts in dissent.  I am sure I’ll have a lot more to say after I’ve read through the opinion 3 or 4 more times. Here’s what’s clear to me though even on a quick read.

First, this is a major victory for opponents of Targeted Regulation of Abortion Provider (TRAP) laws. Armed with this opinion they will have a much easier time in the lower courts challenging such laws. Among other things,  (1) the Court signals much less deference to legislatures than in Gonzales and prior cases (see p. 21 of Opinion); (2) the Court instructs that “The rule announced in Casey, however, requires that courts consider the burdens a law imposes on abortion access together with the benefits” conferred (p. 19) ; (3) the Court clarifies the “large fraction” language from Casey as to what is an undue burden in a way favorable to opponents of these regulations. Let me quote the majority here:

Casey used the language “large fraction” to refer to “a large fraction of cases in which [the provision at issue] is relevant,” a class narrower than “all women,” “pregnant women,” or even “the class of women seeking abortions identified by the State.” 505 U. S., at 894–895 (opinion of the Court) (emphasis added). Here, as in Casey, the rele- vant denominator is “those [women] for whom [the provi- sion] is an actual rather than an irrelevant restriction.” Id., at 895. (p.39)

Contrast that with Justice Alito’s long discussion in his dissent as to his understanding (with the pizzaz that shows why he is such a good writer) in a footnote:

The Court, by contrast, applies the “large fraction” standard without even acknowledging the open question. Ante, at 39. In a similar vein, it holds that the fraction’s “relevant denominator is ‘those [women] for whom [the provision] is an actual rather than an irrelevant re­ striction.’ ” Ibid. (quoting Casey, 505 U. S., at 895). I must confess that I do not understand this holding. The purpose of the large-fraction analysis, presumably, is to compare the number of women actually burdened with the number potentially burdened. Under the Court’s holding, we are supposed to use the same figure (women actually burdened) as both the numerator and the denominator. By my math, that fraction is always “1,” which is pretty large as fractions go.

Second, it is remarkable how differently these sets of opinions read from, let’s say, the gay marriage cases or even Gonzales v. Carhart. All the opinions, except perhaps Justice Ginsburg’s very short concurrence, are decidedly in the “technocratic” mode of writing as opposed to what we might call the “kulturkampf” mode that characterized much of Justice Scalia’s dissents on these kinds of issues. These opinion are written for lawyers not the public. I would have to do a proper count to be sure but it seems to me that something like 2/3 to 3/4 of the total pages of these set of opinions are devoted to issues that only lawyers will be able to engage in — res judicata/claim preclusion, severability, third-party standing, as-applied versus facial challenges, and the cogency of tiers of scrutiny.

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Introducing our 2016 Summer Student Bloggers

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The Petrie-Flom Center is pleased to welcome Kelly Dhru and Shailin Thomas to Bill of Health as our 2016 Summer Student Bloggers!

Kelly Dhru - photo1 (2)Kelly Amal Dhru is an incoming LLM student at the Harvard Law School, and a 2016-17 Fulbright-Nehru Master’s Fellow in Public Health Law and Bioethics from India. Previously, Kelly has completed her BCL (Distinction) and MPhil in Law from University College, University of Oxford, where thesis focused on the gap between rights and duties in the context of laws preventing cruelty to animals. Kelly holds a law degree from Gujarat National Law University, and has been the Research Director at Research Foundation for Governance in India, where she has been involved in drafting laws relating to public health, bioethics and human rights. Kelly has been a research assistant for Public Health Law at King’s College London, taught the Law of Tort, Jurisprudence and Bioethics at the University of Oxford, and Ethics and Philosophy at Ahmedabad University in India. She is a co-founder and storywriter for Lawtoons: a comic series on laws and rights, and been involved spreading awareness about public health and human rights through the use of street theatre.

Thomas Shailin PhotoShailin Thomas is a second year law student in a joint MD/JD program between Harvard Law School and the New York University School of Medicine.  He received a B.S. from Yale University, where he studied cognitive neuroscience — exploring the anatomy and physiology underlying social phenomena.  His interests lie at the intersection of clinical medicine and the legal forces that shape it.  Prior to law school, Shailin worked on both the administrative and clinical sides of health care, and as a research associate at the Berkman Center for Internet & Society.  He is currently an affiliate of the Berkman Center and Outreach Editor for the Harvard Journal of Law & Technology.  A fervent proponent of privacy and freedom of expression, Shailin has also served on the Board of Directors of the American Civil Liberties Union of Connecticut.

Brexit: I woke up this morning and the world had changed

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By John Tingle

I voted in the referendum yesterday along with many others. The referendum turnout was 71.8%, with more than 30 million people voting. It was the highest turnout in a UK-wide vote since the 1992 general election.

My area, Broxtowe in Nottingham where I live, voted to leave the EU, 54.6%, 35754 votes, remain 45.4% 29672 votes. I live in the East Midlands, Middle England. Deep regional divisions have been laid bare by this referendum. It was notable that London largely voted to stay in the EU whereas in my region there was a notable push to leave, 58.5%.The  referendum result shows British politics has, according to the Guardian newspaper, fractured beyond all recognition since the last referendum on Europe in 1975.

The issues around EU membership have been hotly debated and there was a high level of public interest in what went on. Immigration has been the dominant theme in many areas and health along with a number of other issues has also come up. At this moment we are in a post referendum, after shock stage and picking through the fallout to see what is happening and what is going to happen. People are happy, sad and anxious over the result.It was not that long after the vote was announced by the BBC that our Prime Minister David Cameron said he was going to stand down in October, that was a lot to take in so soon after the result. Looking at some of the posts on Facebook it is striking how many young people feel a sense of betrayal by the vote to leave the EU. Many seem to harbour a deep sense of resentment that they have been robbed of a future by an elder generation, it’s the baby boomers against the millennials. Read More

Deborah Lupton on ‘The Week in Health Law’ Podcast

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By Nicolas Terry and Frank Pasquale

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Listen here!

This week our guest is Professor Deborah Lupton, one of the world’s leading digital sociologists. Her new book, The Quantified Self, is the basis of most of our discussion–and it has fascinating lessons for health care lawyers, providers, and patients.

Deborah joined the University of Canberra in early 2014 as a Centenary Research Professor associated with the News & Media Research Centre in the Faculty of Arts & Design. Her research and teaching is multidisciplinary, incorporating sociology, media and communication and cultural studies. Deborah has previously held academic appointments at the University of Sydney, Charles Sturt University and the University of Western Sydney.

Deborah is the author of 15 books and over 150 journal articles and book chapters on topics including the social and cultural dimensions of: medicine and public health; risk; the body; parenting cultures; digital sociology; food; obesity politics; and the emotions. She is an advocate of using social media for academic research and engagement, including Twitter (@DALupton) and her blog This Sociological Life.

Those interested in further exploring the social theory of digital selfhood may be interested in Frank’s piece, The Algorithmic Self. And for some forward-thinking reflections on new technologies of digital health, check out Nic’s recent post at Health Affairs on hearing aids and regualtory arbitrage.

The Week in Health Law Podcast from Frank Pasquale and Nicolas Terry is a commuting-length discussion about some of the more thorny issues in Health Law & Policy. Subscribe at iTunes, listen at Stitcher Radio, Tunein and Podbean, or search for The Week in Health Law in your favorite podcast app. Show notes and more are at TWIHL.com. If you have comments, an idea for a show or a topic to discuss you can find us on twitter @nicolasterry @FrankPasquale @WeekInHealthLaw

The Catch-22 of Bayh-Dole March-In Rights

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By Rachel Sachs

Earlier today, the NIH rejected a request filed by consumer groups including Knowledge Ecology International (KEI) to exercise the government’s march-in rights on an expensive prostate cancer drug, Xtandi.  Xtandi costs upwards of $129,000 per year, and KEI had asked the government to exercise its rights under the Bayh-Dole Act, which specifies a range of conditions under which the government may require a patentholder to grant licenses on reasonable terms to others to practice the patent.  Specifically, the government may require such a license where “action is necessary to alleviate health or safety needs which are not reasonably satisfied,” 35 U.S.C. § 203(a)(2), or where the benefits of the invention are not being made “available to the public on reasonable terms,” 35 U.S.C. § 201(f).

For some time now, there has been debate over the question of whether high prices for pharmaceuticals are a sufficient trigger to invoke the use of march-in rights under these clauses of the statute.  I don’t take a position on that question here.  Instead, I want to ask whose responsibility it is to decide that question.  Congress has the legal right to do so, but it seems unwilling or unable to.  The agencies in question have recently declined to, even assuming they have the power to interpret the statute in that way.  And so we might look to the courts.  But there’s a puzzle here: it’s not clear that anyone can ask a court to decide whether high prices meet the statutory requirements unless an agency actually decides that high prices meet the statutory requirements.

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Implied Certification and Materiality Under the Civil False Claims Act

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By Joan H. Krause

[Cross-posted from Hamilton and Griffin On Rights]

On June 17, the Supreme Court unanimously decided Universal Health Services v. United States ex rel. Escobar (UHS), holding that FCA cases may be predicated on “implied certifications” of compliance as long as the defendant knowingly violates a requirement it knows is material to the government’s payment determination. Because the First Circuit applied an incorrectly broad interpretation of materiality, however, the Justices nonetheless vacated the appellate judgment and remanded. While both parties quickly claimed victory, in reality the decision is likely to satisfy no one and to raise as many questions as it answers.

The case was filed by the parents of a young woman who died after receiving Medicaid-covered mental health treatment from a Massachusetts clinic that failed to satisfy state licensing and supervision regulations. Her parents alleged that the clinic’s MassHealth claims were fraudulent because, by filing for payment, the clinic had implicitly represented that it was in compliance with all relevant state requirements. A district court dismissed the suit but the First Circuit reversed, taking a very broad view of the scope of implied certification. On appeal, UHS asked the Court to reject the implied certification theory, arguing that a failure to disclose noncompliance should not be considered fraudulent in the absence of an affirmative duty to disclose. Respondents, supported by the United States as amicus curiae, countered that a defendant who knowingly bills the government for services without disclosing a failure to meet material conditions has submitted a false claim. While few observers expected the Court to entirely abolish implied certification, at oral argument the Justices appeared deeply divided as to the scope of the theory and the source of any limiting principle.

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