Orcas, Dolphins, and Whales: non-human persons and animal rights

With few exceptions, most cultures put homo sapiens at the center or the apex of creation. Humans, it is generally believed, are distinguished from other animals by our self-awareness and our ability to use tools, to think, reason, and construct meaning and representations about life. The Abrahamic religious traditions are most notable in their anthropocentric vision of human purpose in creation; and although the metaphysics and teleology are sometimes challenged by advances in science and technology, the fact remains that human beings remain the paradigmatic case against which other animals or even artificial intelligence is measured. As a Muslim and a theist, I avow my belief in the unique status of humans; however, as someone who also believes in science and is keenly attuned to the environment, I have a great love for nature and the animal world, and a great desire to protect them.

It is with this, then, that I want to propose to put ethics before metaphysics in considering the moral status of what legal scholars and ethicists call “non-human persons.” In particular, I want to look at cetacean intelligence of orcas, dolphins, and whales to understand the way in which we might classify them as non-human persons which would be given certain rights and protections. Doing so, I argue, would enable us to collapse the bifurcations that influences much of Western thought thereby ushering in a more holistic, ecological and relational approach to ethics and being.

To begin with, I would like to make a distinction clear: I am not claiming that orcas, for example, are morally equivalent to humans, but I am suggesting that we ought to be more cautious with regard to understanding our place in the animal world as a whole, particularly as it relates to the precariousness of life itself. My argument below follows philosophical and ethical reasoning, though this might also be understood in the context of religious texts. The story of Yunus (aka Jonah) and the whale is found in both the Bible and the Qur’an. In short, Yunus felt discouraged that the people of Nineveh did not heed his call to worship God, and so he left in anger. Being cast into the sea, followed by being swallowed by the whale, was ostensibly punishment for his loss of hope and leaving the city without God’s permission; though on another level the exegetical scholars point to the fact of his supplication “O Lord! There is no god but you: Glory to you: I was indeed wrong” (Qur’an 21:87) as instructive of submitting to God’s will and the significance of humility. Indeed, the Qur’an goes on to say elsewhere: “Had he not been of those who exalt God, he would certainly have remained inside the whale until the Day of Resurrection.” (Qur’an 37:143-144). The whale, on this reading, is integral to the Abrahamic worldview insofar as it is the manifestation of God’s power and dominion over creation, as well as his lesson to human beings to remain humble. Read More

REGISTER NOW! Future Directions for Laboratory Animal Law in the United States

Future Directions for Laboratory Animal Law in the United States
January 26, 2018
Wasserstein Hall, Milstein East (2036)
Harvard Law School, 1585 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA

Please join the ILAR Roundtable, the Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics at Harvard Law School, and the Animal Law and Policy Program at Harvard Law School for a one-day meeting to discuss the future of animal law.

This event is free and open to the public, but registration is required. The workshop will also be webcast and will be accessible to all who are interested. Register now!

This event is cosponsored by the Institute for Laboratory Animal Research in the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine; the Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics at Harvard Law School; and the Animal Law & Policy Program at Harvard Law School. 

REGISTER NOW! Future Directions for Laboratory Animal Law in the United States

Future Directions for Laboratory Animal Law in the United States
January 26, 2018
Wasserstein Hall, Milstein East (2036)
Harvard Law School, 1585 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA

Please join the ILAR Roundtable, the Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics at Harvard Law School, and the Animal Law and Policy Program at Harvard Law School for a one-day meeting to discuss the future of animal law.

This event is free and open to the public, but registration is required. The workshop will also be webcast and will be accessible to all who are interested. Register now!

This event is cosponsored by the Institute for Laboratory Animal Research in the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine; the Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics at Harvard Law School; and the Animal Law & Policy Program at Harvard Law School. 

REGISTER NOW! Future Directions for Laboratory Animal Law in the United States

Future Directions for Laboratory Animal Law in the United States
January 26, 2018
Wasserstein Hall, Milstein East (2036)
Harvard Law School, 1585 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA

Please join the ILAR Roundtable, the Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics at Harvard Law School, and the Animal Law and Policy Program at Harvard Law School for a one-day meeting to discuss the future of animal law.

This event is free and open to the public, but registration is required. The workshop will also be webcast and will be accessible to all who are interested. Register now!

This event is cosponsored by the Institute for Laboratory Animal Research in the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine; the Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics at Harvard Law School; and the Animal Law & Policy Program at Harvard Law School. 

REGISTER NOW! Future Directions for Laboratory Animal Law in the United States

Future Directions for Laboratory Animal Law in the United States
January 26, 2018
Wasserstein Hall, Milstein East (2036)
Harvard Law School, 1585 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA

Please join the ILAR Roundtable, the Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics at Harvard Law School, and the Animal Law and Policy Program at Harvard Law School for a one-day meeting to discuss the future of animal law.

This event is free and open to the public, but registration is required. The workshop will also be webcast and will be accessible to all who are interested. Register now!

This event is cosponsored by the Institute for Laboratory Animal Research in the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine; the Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics at Harvard Law School; and the Animal Law & Policy Program at Harvard Law School. 

Chimeras with benefits? Transplants from bioengineered human/pig donors

By Brad Segal

In January of this year, Cell published a study modestly titled, Interspecies Chimerism with Mammalian Pluripotent Stem Cells. It reports success bioengineering a mostly-pig partly-human embryo. One day before, Nature published a report that scientists had grown (for lack of a better word) a functioning genetically-mouse pancreas within the body of a genetically-modified rat. The latest study raises the likelihood that before long, it will also be scientifically possible to grow human organs within bioengineered pigs.

The implications for transplantation are tremendous. But hold the applause for now. Imagine a chimera with a brain made up of human neurons which expressed human genes. Would organ procurement without consent be okay? That troubling possibility raises  questions about whether manufacturing chimeras with human-like properties for organs is even appropriate in the first place. Here’s what University of Montreal bioethicist Vardit Ravitsky told the Washington Post:

“I think the point of these papers is sort of a proof of principle, showing that what researchers intend to achieve with human-non-human chimeras might be possible … The more you can show that it stands to produce something that will actually save lives … the more we can demonstrate that the benefit is real, tangible and probable — overall it shifts the scale of risk-benefit assessment, potentially in favor of pursuing research and away from those concerns that are more philosophical and conceptual.”

I respectfully disagree. Saving more lives, of course, is good. Basic science is also valuable – even more so if it might translate to the bedside. This line of research, though, is positioned to upend our entire system of transplantation, and so its implications go beyond organ supply. In this post I will argue that to assess this technology’s implications for organ procurement in particular, there is good reason to focus on harms, not benefits. Read More

Violations of federal antifraud provisions alleged against two hepatitis B treatment producers

By Wendy S. Salkin

Two investor class-action suits have been filed within days of one another against two different California-based pharmaceutical companies both of which produce hepatitis B treatments, Dynavax Technologies and Arrowhead Pharmaceuticals. The named plaintiffs in both shareholder class-action suits, David Soontjens and Yaki J. Meller, are represented by counsel at Pomerantz, LLP.[1]

Meller v. Arrowhead Pharmaceuticals, Inc., et al., complaint filed (C. D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2016)

On November 15th, named plaintiff Yaki J. Meller filed a Class Action Complaint in the United States District Court for the Central District of California against Pasadena-based Arrowhead Pharmaceuticals, Inc., its President and CEO (Christopher Anzalone), and its CFO (Kenneth Myszkowski). Arrowhead is a biopharmaceutical company that, according to its website, “develops medicines that treat intractable diseases by silencing the genes that cause them.”

Among its clinical stage drugs are ARC-520 and ARC-521, which “are designed to treat chronic hepatitis B virus infection by reducing the expression and release of new viral particles and key viral proteins with the goal of achieving a functional cure.” ARC-520 is the drug at issue. According to the Complaint, Arrowhead knew but failed to disclose that ARC-520 “could be fatal at its higher doses and that the FDA was unlikely to approve the treatment as a result.”[2] In particular, the Complaint alleges that Arrowhead:

made false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) the Company’s ARC-520 was unsafe at certain doses and caused deaths in an ongoing primate toxicology study; and (ii) as a result, Arrowhead’s public statements were materially false and misleading at all relevant times.

According to Meller’s Complaint, in so doing, Arrowhead violated Sections 10(b) (“Position Limits and Position Accountability for Security-Based Swaps and Large Trader Reporting.”) and 20(a) (“Liability to contemporaneous traders for insider trading.”) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, “Position Limits and Position Accountability for Security-Based Swaps and Large Trader Reporting” and “Liability to contemporaneous traders for insider trading,” respectively, and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, “Employment of manipulative and deceptive devices.”

Read More

A Common Morality?

By Seán Finan

600px-lab_mouse_mg_3244Last week, a patent application in India was refused, apparently on the basis that the invention under review could have been used to counterfeit money. This practice of denying patents on the basis of public policy or morality is almost as old as the practice of granting patents. For example, the State of Monopolies was enacted in England in 1624 to prohibit monopolies where they would be “mischievous to the State”. In many other jurisdictions, patents on food and medicines were prohibited, on the basis that the public good served by these products outweighed any claims of monopoly rights by the inventor. The other approach is preferred in the US. Cases like Diamond v Chakrabarty removed much of the normative question from American patent law and it has been strongly argued that a patent application “is not an ethical event.”

Whether a patent can be refused on the basis of morality is a difficult enough question, but the problem is compounded once the “morality” in question is not confined to a single jurisdiction. The harmonization of patent law across Europe in the last fifty years has forced the European Patent Office (EPO) to consider how to make a moral judgement on behalf of all the contracting states to the European Patent Convention. Its approach has been neither consistent between cases nor consistent with the underlying treaties. I would like to give a quick sketch of the contrast between the European legal framework and its manifestation in the decisions of the EPO.

Read More

TOMORROW (9/30): Non-Human Primates in Research – Legal and Ethical Considerations

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Non-Human Primates in Research: Legal and Ethical Considerations
September 30, 2015, 12:00 PM
Wasserstein Hall, Room 1010
Harvard Law School, 1585 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA [Map]

Description:

Please join us for a discussion of critical legal, ethical, scientific, and social issues raised by research involving non-human primates, and the research centers that house them.  What does the current regulatory structure require and permit, what gaps exist, what enforcement problems have arisen, and how are they being addressed at Harvard and elsewhere?  How should scientific and medical interests be balanced against the interests of the animals, and how might the ethical and/or regulatory analysis differ depending on the type of primate involved?  What trends are emerging with regard to funding, scientific approaches, and public opinion?  Our panelists will address these questions and others in the course of a lively debate.

Panelists: Read More

UPCOMING EVENT (9/30): Non-Human Primates in Research – Legal and Ethical Considerations

 

macaque_focusDzingNon-Human Primates in Research: Legal and Ethical Considerations
September 30, 2015, 12:00 PM
Wasserstein Hall, Room 1010
Harvard Law School, 1585 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, MA [Map]

 

Description:

Please join us for a discussion of critical legal, ethical, scientific, and social issues raised by research involving non-human primates, and the research centers that house them.  What does the current regulatory structure require and permit, what gaps exist, what enforcement problems have arisen, and how are they being addressed at Harvard and elsewhere?  How should scientific and medical interests be balanced against the interests of the animals, and how might the ethical and/or regulatory analysis differ depending on the type of primate involved?  What trends are emerging with regard to funding, scientific approaches, and public opinion?  Our panelists will address these questions and others in the course of a lively debate.

Panelists:

  • Hope Ferdowsian, MD, MPH, Adjunct Associate Professor, Georgetown University Medical Center and Adjunct Assistant Clinical Professor of Medicine, George Washington University Department of Medicine

This event is free and open to the public. Lunch will be provided.

Cosponsored by the Animal Law and Policy Program at Harvard Law School.