Bill of Health Interview with Einer Elhauge on Health Care Reform

As you have already heard a few times on this blog, Professor Einer Elhauge, the Petrie-Flom Center’s Founding Faculty Director and Petrie Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, has a new book out on health care reform called Obamacare on Trial.  The book collects various essays that Prof. Elhauge published in popular media outlets, along with several postscripts, and it has received all sorts of glowing praise.

Prof. Elhauge has graciously agreed to answer some questions for us in the first ever Bill of Health e-interview.  Check it out:

Bill of Health: So, first things first, did the Supreme Court get it right in NFIB v. Sebelius?

Prof. Elhauge: The Supreme Court got the tax issue right, and I think the Medicaid expansion as well, but I think the Supreme Court got the commerce clause issue totally wrong.  Worse, the way they got it wrong portends trouble for the future.

Bill of Health: What were you most surprised by in the SCOTUS decision?

Prof. Elhauge: The fact that a majority of the Supreme Court was willing to use a methodology that clearly expanded judicial discretion to overrule the political branches, and that no one really ever called them on it either on the Supreme Court or in the briefing.

Bill of Health: You’ve noted that you didn’t originally take the constitutional challenges to the Affordable Care Act seriously.  Why do you think they were able to gain such traction?

Prof. Elhauge: I think the big problem was that the government never directly rebutted either the claim that purchase mandates were unprecedented or the dreaded broccoli hypothetical.  Instead they tried to evade the question, I guess because they thought it was unfavorable to them, but the iron rule of litigation is that if you don’t discuss your problematic issues, then you leave your opponents to be the only one that discusses them, and they are sure to frame them in the way most unfavorable to you. The government’s unwillingness to engage this issue left the Supreme Court with the entirely false impression that Obamacare fundamentally changed the relationship between the individual and government, and that thus the government faced a heavy burden to justify the health insurance mandate.  I think the government should’ve directly argued that in fact federal purchase mandates were not at all unprecedented, but rather that health insurance mandates went all the way back to the framers, who adopted two health insurance mandates in the 1790s in Congresses that had many framers on them.  The government should’ve also pointed out that the argument that courts can, in the name of “limiting principles”, create brand-new restrictions on congressional power that have no basis in the Constitution in order to restrain the possibility that Congress might exercise a power in a silly way, like adopting a broccoli mandate, amounts to a remarkable usurpation of political power by the judicial branches.  One could equally say that because Congress might pass silly laws like a law prohibiting the purchase of broccoli, the federal courts should impose a new constitutional limit that prevents Congress from ever restricting commerce. Or because Congress might tax 100% of our income to buy broccoli or go to war to get more broccoli, the Supreme Court should invalidate Congress’s power to tax or declare war.  The “limiting principles” argument that was employed here ironically has no limiting principle and looks benign but is actually a wolf in sheep’s clothing.

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The Contraceptives Coverage Saga Continues…

Well, hopefully we’ll know the fate of the ACA by tonight.  But even if President Obama wins, there will still be uncertainty about the fate of the contraceptives coverage mandate.

A number of employers claim that the mandate violates their rights to religious freedom by requiring them to offer free coverage for medical products and services they find objectionable, and the administration has taken a number of steps to offer accommodations.  But as a neutral law of general applicability, the mandate doesn’t violate the First Amendment under SCOTUS jurisprudence, and even under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, there’s a strong argument that the mandate is ok, either on the grounds that it does not actually impose a substantial burden on religious exercise or that  it is supported by a compelling government interest.

Nonetheless, federal courts have reached different conclusions as to the mandate’s permissibility.  In July, a federal district judge in Colorado issued a preliminary injunction blocking enforcement of the mandate against a religious employer running a secular (HVAC) business, while in September, a federal district judge in St. Louis rejected a similar challenge by the religious owner of a mining company.  Last week, a federal district judge in Detroit also issued a preliminary injunction against enforcement, indicating that while neither side had shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits, “The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”  Several other challenges to the mandate remain pending.

So let’s just add this to the list of uncertainties that will remain after the results of today’s election are in – and to the list of reasons why employer-based health care really ought to be abandoned in favor of a single-payer, public system.

There, now that ought to get some discussion started…

Upcoming Event – The Guatemala STD Inoculation Studies: What Should We Do Now?

Tuesday, November 13, 2012
12:30-2:00
Wasserstein Hall, Classroom 3019
Harvard Law School

In the late 1940s, US and Guatemalan researchers conducted a host of experiments on vulnerable Guatemalan subjects, purposefully exposing them to and infecting them with a number of STDs without their consent.  The experiments were kept hidden for more than half a century, until they were discovered and exposed only recently by historian Susan Reverby.  The US government has since apologized for what happened, but a class action suit brought on behalf of the Guatemalan subjects was dismissed in June and efforts to directly compensate the victims have not been forthcoming.   Please join Harvard Law School’s Petrie-Flom Center and Human Rights Program for a panel discussion of the study and possible legal and political responses that may be available now, both domestically and from an international human rights perspective.  Panelists will include:

  • Susan Reverby, Marion Butler McLean Professor in the History of Ideas, Professor of Women’s and Gender Studies, Wellesley College
  • I. Glenn Cohen, Assistant Professor of Law, Faculty Co-Director, Petrie-Flom Center, Harvard Law School
  • Holly Fernandez Lynch, Executive Director, Petrie-Flom Center, Lecturer on Law, Harvard Law School
  • Wendy Parmet,  George J. and Kathleen Waters Matthews Distinguished University Professor of Law, Northeastern University School of Law
  • Fernando Ribeiro Delgado, Clinical Instructor and Lecturer on Law, Human Rights Program, Harvard Law School

This event is free and open to the public.  Lunch and refreshments will be served.

 

Physician-Assisted Suicide in MA

Next Tuesday, those of us registered in Massachusetts will have the opportunity to vote on “Question 2” – prescribing medication to end life, otherwise known as physician-assisted suicide.  As described by the state secretary, “This proposed law would allow a physician licensed in Massachusetts to prescribe medication, at a terminally ill patient’s request, to end that patient’s life. To qualify, a patient would have to be an adult resident who (1) is medically determined to be mentally capable of making and communicating health care decisions; (2) has been diagnosed by attending and consulting physicians as having an incurable, irreversible disease that will, within reasonable medical judgment, cause death within six months; and (3) voluntarily expresses a wish to die and has made an informed decision.”  There are, of course, a number of other safeguards built in, such as the need to make the request twice, separated by 15 days, in the presence of witnesses.  However, there could probably be stronger safeguards to protect individuals who are experiencing depression and anxiety, and might have preferable alternatives to physician-assisted death.

The proposed law is similar to measures already in place in Oregon and Washington state, where statistics show relatively low uptake and certainly not the sort of slippery slope that critics seem to be worried about.  In today’s NY Times, however, Zeke Emanuel describes 4 myths about physician-assisted suicide that might give some pause to people like me who plan to vote “Yes” on Question 2.  In the end, though, it strikes me that preserving room for maximal choice in these difficult end-of-life situations is for the best.

Without delving into the merits, which has been done very well elsewhere, let me just make a quick note about something else that struck me re: Question 2, which was the pamphlet of materials I received at home about the ballot measure.  It came from the state secretary, had an excellent, understandable summary of the law and what it would do, and included brief statements for and against written by selected advocates.  I thought this was an incredible mechanism to promote informed voting and deliberative democracy – and because I always have human subjects research ethics on the brain, it made me think of the possible ways this approach could be adapted to improve informed consent.  Perhaps traditional consent forms could be accompanied by a brief neutral statement about a study from the IRB, followed by short statements pro and con about the decision to participate. Just a thought.

And finally, one more note: we’re having a bioethics-heavy election day in Massachusetts this year.  Question 3 is about whether we should eliminate state criminal and civil penalties for the medical use of marijuana by qualifying patients.

 

PCSBI: Privacy and Progress in Whole Genome Sequencing

Yesterday, President Obama’s Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues released its fifth report: Privacy and Progress in Whole Genome Sequencing.  I haven’t had a chance to digest it yet, but for now, just wanted to call it to everyone’s attention.  The gist seems to be privacy, privacy, privacy.

Here are the major recommendations, straight from the Commission’s “mouth”:

Recommendation 1.1
Funders of whole genome sequencing research; managers of research, clinical, and commercial databases; and policy makers should maintain or establish clear policies defining acceptable access to and permissible uses of whole genome sequence data. These policies should promote opportunities for models of data sharing by individuals who want to share their whole genome sequence data with clinicians, researchers, or others.

Recommendation 1.2
The Commission urges federal and state governments to ensure a consistent floor of privacy protections covering whole genome sequence data regardless of how they were obtained. These policies should protect individual privacy by prohibiting unauthorized whole genome sequencing without the consent of the individual from whom the sample came.

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Obama v. Romney on Health Care

Ok, so we’ll have a NEJM-heavy day today! But you’ve got to check out one more thing, statements from the presidential candidates on the future of American health care.  This was the topic of a hugely successful Petrie-Flom Center event earlier this week, which was – sadly – off the record.  We heard from the candidates’ representatives, but here it is directly from the source(s):

NEJM: Cutting Family Planning in Texas (and more)

Our friends over at the New England Journal of Medicine just alerted us to a new perspectives piece addressing the impact of cutting family planning funds in Texas (the piece was also picked up by Politico).  The authors interviewed 56 leaders of organizations throughout the state that provided reproductive health services using public funding before cuts went into effect, and what they found was disturbing:

  • Most clinics have restricted access to the most effective contraceptive methods because of their higher up-front costs (choosing pills over IUDs or subdermal implants).
  • Clinics have started to turn away those who canot pay, when previously their visits would have been covered by public funds, and women who can pay the newly instated fees are choosing less effective methods and fewer tests to save money.
  • A number of clinics have lost their exemption from Texas’ law requiring parental consent for teens under 18 who seek contraceptives.

Overall, the authors conclude that laws intended to defund Planned Parenthood in an attempt to limit access to abortion (even though federal and state funding cannot be used for abortion anyway) have resulted in policies limiting women’s access to range of preventative reproductive health services and screenings.

Alta Charo weighs in via a NEJM podcast, discussing the future of reproductive health care for women in the US, particularly in light of upcoming elections (as well as the article we discussed last week on conscientious action, and other general issues in reproductive health policy).  Take a listen!

And one more NEJM plug for now: our Bill of Health blogger Kevin Outterson also has a podcast online discussing the record-breaking settlements of pharmaceutical fraud cases and the need for further regulation.

New Book on Conscientious Objection in Health Care

Related to the conversations we’ve been having lately on conscience, I wanted to point you to a relatively new book on the topic by Mark WicclairConscientious Objection in Health Care: An Ethical Analysis, Cambridge University Press, 2011.

From Amazon: “Historically associated with military service, conscientious objection has become a significant phenomenon in health care. Mark Wicclair offers a comprehensive ethical analysis of conscientious objection in three representative health care professions: medicine, nursing and pharmacy. He critically examines two extreme positions: the ‘incompatibility thesis’, that it is contrary to the professional obligations of practitioners to refuse provision of any service within the scope of their professional competence; and ‘conscience absolutism’, that they should be exempted from performing any action contrary to their conscience. He argues for a compromise approach that accommodates conscience-based refusals within the limits of specified ethical constraints. He also explores conscientious objection by students in each of the three professions, discusses conscience protection legislation and conscience-based refusals by pharmacies and hospitals, and analyzes several cases. His book is a valuable resource for scholars, professionals, trainees, students, and anyone interested in this increasingly important aspect of health care.”

Larry McCullough writes a glowing review over at Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.

Mark’s book is broader than mine (Conflicts of Conscience in Health Care: An Institutional Compromise) in that he addresses conscientious objection as it arises in a variety of health care professions, as well as institutional objections, whereas I focus exclusively on objection by individual physicians.  However, Mark focuses on the ethics and ethical limits of conscientious objection, and does not consider means to enforce those limits or ensure patient access.  Such practical details are a major focus of my book.  So check them both out!

[H/T Glenn Cohen, via John Goldberg]

More on Conscience and Civil Disobedience

Over at The Hastings Center’s Bioethics Forum blog, there’s an interesting post from Rosana Triviño addressing the difference between conscientious refusal and civil disobedience, in relation to Spain’s new law limiting care for undocumented immigrants.  This links nicely to some conversation we’ve been having here at Bill of Health as to whether conscientious refusals and actions ought to be thought of similarly and granted similar protections.

One thing I’m puzzling over is the relevance (or not) of institutional support for the conscientious behavior in question.  So in Spain, several medical organizations have encouraged physicians to avoid withdrawing care from undocumented immigrants, and of course in the US and elsewhere, there are many groups that encourage physicians not to perform abortions and other controversial services.  Does institutional involvement make something look more like civil disobedience?  I think the answer is “kind of.”

Ultimately, something is clearly civil disobedience when refusers or actors – 1 or 100 or 1000 – violate the law on the books for conscientious reasons.  But where numbers or institutions can matter is when refusers refuse on grounds of conscience to do something that is legal but not required.  Their refusals are not violating the law, individually or collectively, and there is no technical disobedience.  But when there are enough refusals to do what the law allows, the law may as well say something different.  And particularly when those refusals are coordinated in some way to prevent access to what the law allows, things start to look a lot more like civil disobedience.  So conscientious violation of law seems to be sufficient but not necessary for civil disobedience, which on a broad view could also include efforts to sabotage or impede a law through collective inaction.

What do you think?