Limelight v. Akamai: Implications for Medical Method Patents

By Rachel Sachs

Last month, as it wrapped up the 2014 Term, the Supreme Court decided a patent law case that could have a major impact on method patents in the medical arena. No, I’m not talking about Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank, the most Rorschach-like of the Term’s many patent opinions. I’m talking about Limelight Networks v. Akamai Technologies, Inc., in which the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Federal Circuit’s ruling on the scintillating question of divided infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).

In Limelight, a splintered en banc decision, a majority of the Federal Circuit had overturned prior case law in ruling that liability for induced infringement of a method claim under § 271(b) was possible where no single entity had performed all the steps of that claim, but where those steps were divided between two or more parties, one of whom had induced the other(s) to infringe. (Previously, various opinions had held that induced infringement under § 271(b) required a single actor, just like direct infringement under current § 271(a) precedent.) In a unanimous opinion by Justice Alito, the Supreme Court reversed, essentially reinstating the single entity rule by holding that direct infringement under § 271(a) is required for inducement liability under § 271(b). Read More

Medical Malpractice: FTCA’s Trap for the Unwary

By Alex Stein

Anyone interested in medical malpractice must read the First Circuit’s decision in Sanchez v. United States, 740 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2014).

Mr. Sanchez’s wife died in a Massachusetts hospital shortly after delivering her third child by c-section. She died from arguably preventable hemorrhaging. Mr. Sanchez and his lawyer thought that they had a 3-year window for filing medical malpractice suit in connection with that death, as prescribed by Massachusetts law, Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 260, § 2A. Unbeknownst to them, however, the hospital was a federally qualified health center, which made the doctors who treated Mrs. Sanchez “federal employees” under the Federally Supported Health Centers Assistance Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. § 233. As a result, Mr. Sanchez could only sue the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). He wouldn’t mind doing so, but his ability to file such a suit had expired in two years pursuant to FTCA. This predicament is known as FTCA’s trap for the unwary: see here. Read More

Translating “ELSI” into Policy

by Guest Blogger Wylie Burke MD, PhD.

When the Human Genome Project began in 1990, the National Center for Human Genome Research – now the National Human Genome Research Institute (NHGRI) – created a research funding program for evaluation of the ethical, legal, and social implications (ELSI) of genomics. ELSI scholars study a wide range of issues, from the responsible conduct of genomic research, to implementation and outcomes of genetic testing programs, to intellectual property challenges.  But how should this research be evaluated? In particular, what impact should we expect for this kind of research? These questions are particularly challenging for those of us who work in the multidisciplinary Centers of Excellence in ELSI Research (CEERs) funded by the NHGRI, because these centers have been given a programmatic charge to consider policy-relevant questions and help to inform the policy-making process. A group of ELSI researchers, representing seven CEERs, have been deliberating these questions and recently published a paper with recommendations.

We noted, first of all, that policy-making occurs in many venues. Although discussions often focus on governmental policies, policy-making in other venues often influences genomic translation, including actions as diverse as Institutional Review Board (IRB) decisions about consent and return of results; guidelines promulgated by professional organizations; funding decisions of health insurers; and investment decisions of venture capital.   In addition, policy-making in one arena may influence the need for policies in another. For example, practice guidelines influence the use of genetic testing and may in turn influence how clinical data are accessed to evaluate test outcomes, or how IRBs decide what genetic results should be returned to research participants. Read More

Medicare Coverage for Sex Change Surgery: How We Got Here

As mentioned in co-blogger Matthew Lawrence‘s prior posts (here) and (here), Medicare’s Departmental Appeals Board (DAB) recently vacated a decades-old National Coverage Determination (NCD) precluding coverage for sex change therapy.  That opens the door for Medicare coverage for sex change therapy, but does not guarantee coverage.

In this second blog of a two-part post, we will discuss how we got here: the somewhat unique process taken by the Centers for Medicare & Medicare Services (CMS) to invalidate its old coverage decision.

The decision has a somewhat odd procedural history.  On the morning of March 29, 2013, the CMS announced that it was reconsidering the NCD through the formal process for doing so, and sought public comment on what it should do.  (See enthusiastic coverage here.)  The statutory, public process for reconsideration of an NCD includes the opportunity for comment and so on, analogous to notice and comment rulemaking.  And the ultimate decision is subject to judicial review.  (See here for more on the NCD process.)  The NCD reconsideration process could have not only vacated the old standard, but offered specific standards to govern coverage across claimants (and thereby avoided some of the limbo discussed in our last post).

But on the night of March 29, 2013, the CMS rescinded its call for public comment, saying that it would instead allow a “just filed” appeal challenging the NCD before the DAB to proceed.  (See here.)  The DAB process is more adversarial and pits a single beneficiary challenging CMS policy in his or her case against the CMS.  (Although there are opportunities for amici to participate.  In this case, six amici participated, and all of them argued that the ban was unlawful.)  The CMS went on to decline to defend the policy, which made the ultimate DAB decision vacating the (undefended) policy unsurprising.

We can’t say why the CMS chose to rescind the reconsideration process rather than push for the individual appeal before the DAB to be held in abeyance pending the outcome of the reconsideration.  (In federal court, the doctrine of “ripeness” would have made the pendency of the NCD reconsideration grounds for dismissal of the individual appeal.)  And for transgender persons seeking coverage, the process by which their cause was furthered is surely of little moment.  But we can’t help but note that, for better or worse, proceeding through the DAB rather than the formal NCD reconsideration process meant less public attention on the proceeding, and less opportunity for comment by interested groups.

Call for Submissions: Journal of Law and the Biosciences

JLB coverCall for Submissions: Journal of Law and the Biosciences

Deadline: Rolling.

The Journal of Law and the Biosciences (JLB) is actively soliciting original manuscripts, responses, essays, and book reviews devoted to the examination of issues related to the intersection of law and biosciences, including bioethics, neuroethics, genetics, reproductive technologies, stem cells, enhancement, patent law, and food and drug regulation. JLB welcomes submissions of varying length, with a theoretical, empirical, practical, or policy oriented focus.

JLB is the first fully open access peer-reviewed legal journal focused on the advances at the intersection of law and the biosciences. A co-venture between Duke University, Harvard Law School, and Stanford University, and published by Oxford University Press, this open access, online, and interdisciplinary academic journal publishes cutting-edge scholarship in this important new field. JLB is published as one volume with three issues per year with new articles posted online on an ongoing basis.

For more information about JLB, click here. To submit a manuscript, click here.

Big Data, Predictive Analytics, Health Care, Law, and Ethics

Update: The Moore Foundation has generously paid to make my article available as open access on their website here. Today I am speaking at Health Affairs’ “Using Big Data to Transform Health Care” in DC, that will also launch its new issue devoted to the topic. I have a co-authored paper in the volume entitled “The Legal And Ethical Concerns That Arise From Using Complex Predictive Analytics In Health Care” that has just been released. Ironically the article is behind a paywall (while data wants to be free, I guess big data is different!) Here is the abstract.

Predictive analytics, or the use of electronic algorithms to forecast future events in real time, makes it possible to harness the power of big data to improve the health of patients and lower the cost of health care. However, this opportunity raises policy, ethical, and legal challenges. In this article we analyze the major challenges to implementing predictive analytics in health care settings and make broad recommendations for overcoming challenges raised in the four phases of the life cycle of a predictive analytics model: acquiring data to build the model, building and validating it, testing it in real-world settings, and disseminating and using it more broadly. For instance, we recommend that model developers implement governance structures that include patients and other stakeholders starting in the earliest phases of development. In addition, developers should be allowed to use already collected patient data without explicit consent, provided that they comply with federal regulations regarding research on human subjects and the privacy of health information.

I will also have a related paper on mobile health coming out later this summer that I will blog about when it comes out…

Art Caplan: Facebook Experiment Used Silicon Valley Trickery

Art Caplan has a new opinion piece on NBCNews about a recently published study in The Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, where a  Facebook scientist teamed up with two academics to subtly tweak the news feeds of nearly 700,000 Facebook users.

From the piece:

“The question of whether or not an experiment is ethical hinges upon the question of “informed consent.” Generally, this means that a subject in a study needs to have basic information about the study he’s participating in, understand the nature of the experiment and its risks and benefits, and have the ability to withhold his consent without fear of harm or retribution.

The authors of the study argue that they obtained subject consent: Their manipulation of Facebook users’ emotions was “… consistent with Facebook’s Data Use Policy, to which all users agree prior to creating an account on Facebook, constituting informed consent for this research.” This is nonsense; it’s not informed consent. It is an old Silicon Valley trick for systematically eliminating the legal rights of its customers.”

Read the full article.

Justice Breyer and Wheaton College v. Burwell

By Gregory Curfman

Tom Goldstein, Publisher of SCOTUSblog, has opined on why Justice Stephen Breyer apparently joined the majority opinion in Wheaton College v. Burwell, which the Court released last Thursday. The majority granted Wheaton a temporary injunction exempting the College from the contraceptive mandate, which was spawned by the Affordable Care Act and which the College claimed violates its religious principles. The vote was 6 to 3, with Justice Scalia filing a concurrence (agreeing “in the result”) and Justices Sotomayor, Ginsburg, and Kagan issuing a forceful dissent. The opinion was unsigned, leaving ambiguous whether Justice Breyer actually did join the majority, though the numbers leave little doubt that he did.

Tom Goldstein believes that Justice Breyer joined the majority because, in doing so, he gained more than he lost. In addition to granting the College an injunction, the majority opinion also states that nothing in the opinion prohibits the government from taking steps to provide women access to contraceptive agents without a copayment. The specific language in the opinion is:

“Nothing in this order precludes the Government from relying on this notice, to the extent it considers it necessary, to facilitate the provision of full contraceptive coverage under the Act.”

Thus, Tom Goldstein believes that in joining the majority, Justice Breyer accomplished the pragmatic objective of preventing the loss of contraceptive coverage for the nation’s women who are employed by nonprofit organizations.

Without comment from Justice Breyer himself, we of course cannot know why he (presumably) joined the majority in Wheaton College v. Burwell, despite the fact he dissented when the Court granted Wheaton College a brief (two-day) injunction earlier in the week. And despite the fact that he also joined Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan in issuing a very strong dissent in Hobby Lobby v. Burwell. Read More