The Peer Review Privilege: No Exception for Objective Facts

By Alex Stein

The Michigan Supreme Court’s recent decision in Krusac v. Covenant Medical Center, Inc., — N.W.2d —- (Mich. 2015), 2015 WL 1809371, foiled an attempt at establishing an “objective fact” exception to the peer review privilege.  An elderly hospital patient allegedly rolled off the operating table, fell on the floor, and died shortly thereafter. As part of the hospital’s peer review procedure, one of the nurses compiled an incident report and submitted it to her superiors. The plaintiff in the ensuing wrongful death action subpoenaed that report. The trial judge ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to see the report’s first page that summarized the facts of the incident. The hospital appealed all the way to Michigan’s Supreme Court to vindicate its rights under the state’s peer review privilege, MCL 333.20175(8) & MCL 333.21515, that extends to “records, data, and knowledge collected for or by individuals or committees assigned a professional review function in a health facility or agency, or an institution of higher education in this state that has colleges of osteopathic and human medicine.” These information items are  “confidential, … are not public records, and are not subject to court subpoena.” Read More

“Medical Malpractice” vs. General Negligence: The Case of Falling Accidents

By Alex Stein

As I wrote previously – see here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here – whether a tort action sounds in “medical malpractice” as opposed to general negligence, or vice versa, can be crucial. Suits sounding in “medical malpractice” must satisfy special requirements that include shortened limitations periods, statutes of repose, and expert affidavits (or certificates of merit) at filing. In many states, those suits are also subject to special damage caps. Suits sounding in general negligence are free from these constraints. Filing and prosecuting those suits is consequently not as onerous and expensive as filing and prosecuting medical malpractice actions. For that reason, we witness many disputes over this pivotal categorization issue. Read More

Medical Malpractice and the Middle-Ground Fallacy: Should Victims’ Families Recover Compensation for Emotional Harm?

By Alex Stein

Medical malpractice victims are generally entitled to recover compensation for emotional harm they endure: see, e.g., Alexander v. Scheid, 726 N.E.2d 272, 283–84 (Ind. 2000). But what about a victim’s close family member? Take a person who suffers emotional distress from witnessing a medical mistreatment and the consequent injury or demise of her loved one. Should the court obligate the negligent physician or hospital to compensate that person for her emotional harm?

This question has no uniform answer under our medical malpractice laws. Some states allow victims’ families to recover compensation for their emotional harm, while others do not. Three weeks ago, the Connecticut Supreme Court struck a middle ground between these two extremes. Squeo v. Norwalk Hosp. Ass’n, 316 Conn. 558, — A.3d —- (Conn. 2015). Read More

“Error in Judgment” and Informed Consent

By Alex Stein

When conventional standards of practice allow a physician to choose between two or more ways to treat or diagnose a patient, she is free to select any of those ways. The fact that her chosen procedure subsequently proves inferior to the alternatives and works badly for the patient is of no consequence: the physician would not be liable for malpractice because malpractice accusations only attach to actions and not to consequences. Whether a physician did or did not deliver substandard treatment to the patient must be determined prospectively (ex ante) rather than by hindsight (ex post). Because a medically approved procedure that proves inferior to another recommended procedure appears negligent, jurors must receive an effective warning against this misleading appearance. How to best administer this warning is a matter of split among state courts. Read More

The Scope of Virginia’s Birth–Related Neurological Injury Compensation Program

By Alex Stein

Virginia’s Birth–Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act of 1987 (BRNICA) affords aggrieved patients a no-fault compensation remedy for qualified injuries while giving potential tort defendants – doctors and hospitals who choose to participate in the Birth–Related Neurological Injury Compensation Fund – an absolute immunity from malpractice liability. Va. Code Ann. § 38.2-5002. For a parallel Florida statute, see Fla. Stat. § 766.302. Participation in this program is optional for both patients and care providers. The program compensates injured children for disability damages not covered by the government, health benefit plans, and private insurance. Pain, suffering, and other noneconomic damages are noncompensable (in Florida, they are capped at a low amount). By electing to receive treatment from a participating provider, the patient commits herself and her future child to pursue any compensation claim for birth-related neurological injury before a special administrative tribunal and automatically waives the right to bring a medical malpractice lawsuit against the participating physician or hospital. Wolfe v. Va. Birth–Related Neurological Injury Comp. Program, 580 S.E.2d 467, 476 (Va. 2003).

Because injury claims adjudicated by the tribunal do not depend upon medical malpractice, the tribunal’s decisions need not be reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank pursuant to the Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986. This Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11131, only requires reporting of payments “under a policy of insurance, self-insurance, or otherwise in settlement (or partial settlement) of, or in satisfaction of a judgment in, a medical malpractice action or claim.”

The scope of BRNICA’s coverage is consequently of paramount importance for patients, doctors, and hospitals. Virginia’s appellate court’s decision in Women’s Healthcare Associates, Inc. v. Mucci clarifies this scope. Read More

The Timeline Approach to Medical Malpractice Defenses

By Alex Stein

California’s Court of Appeal has recently delivered a first-impression decision on the conditions under which a patient’s own negligence can be asserted as a defense against medical malpractice allegations. Harb v. City of Bakersfield, — Cal.Rptr.3d —- (Cal.App. 5th Dist. 2015) 2015 WL 302291.  Among the materials cited by this decision was my article, Toward a Theory of Medical Malpractice, 97 Iowa Law Review 1201 (2012). The court used my “timeline approach” to separate the patient’s pre-treatment negligence, upon which providers of substandard medical care cannot rely, from self-injurious behaviors that occur during and after treatment and that can properly mitigate – and in extreme cases, even eliminate – the legal consequences of medical malpractice. Read More

Organ Transplant Malpractice and the “Proximate Cause”

By Alex Stein

Everyone interested in that area must read Shierts v. University of Minnesota Physicians, — N.W.2d — (Minn.App.2014), 2014 WL 7344014.

This important – yet, unreported – decision deals with a medical-malpractice action arising out of the patient’s death from cancer contracted from a donated pancreas. The trial court dismissed the action summarily based on the “proximate cause” doctrine, and the plaintiff appealed against that dismissal. Read More

Do Medical-Malpractice Time Bars Apply to Hospitals’ Indemnification Suits Against Doctors?

By Alex Stein

The South Carolina Supreme Court has recently decided that a hospital’s indemnification suit against doctors whose malpractice made it pay compensation to the aggrieved patient is subject to the same time bars as patients’ actions against defaulting physicians. Columbia/CSA-HS Greater Columbia Healthcare System, LP v…., — S.E.2d —- (2015), 2015 WL 249536 (S.C. 2015).

Chief Justice Jean Hoefer Toal wrote a vehement dissent in which she was joined by Justice Kaye Hearn. In that dissent, she wrote that “The majority’s holding represents a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of indemnification actions which I fear will have far-reaching effects on the ability to seek indemnification.”

The Chief Justice was absolutely right. Read More

Caps, Settlements, and Chutzpah under California’s Medical Malpractice Law

By Alex Stein

A recent California Supreme Court decision, Rashidi v. Moser, — P.3d —- (Cal. 2014), must be read by anyone interested in medical malpractice and in torts generally.

This decision involved a very serious incident of medical malpractice. A patient underwent surgery to stop severe nosebleed. His doctor ran a catheter through an artery in his leg up into his nose. Tiny particles were injected through the catheter to irreversibly block certain blood vessels. The particles, however, traveled to places other than the intended sites. As a result, when the patient awoke after the surgery he was permanently blind in one eye. He sued the doctor and the hospital for medical malpractice and the particles’ manufacturer for products liability. Subsequently, the patient settled with the particles’ manufacturer for $2,000,000 and with the hospital for another $350,000. The case went to trial against the doctor alone. Read More