Sequenom vs. Ariosa and international approaches to the patent eligibility of biomedical innovation

By Timo Minssen

With a potential petition for writ of certiorari in the Sequenom v. Ariosa case approaching, it appears as if the US Supreme Court  will once again have to consider crucial patent eligibility questions with a great significance for biomedical innovation and diagnostic methods.

The claims at issue (see U.S. Patent No. 6,258,540 ) are directed to methods of genetic testing by detecting and amplifying paternally inherited fetal cell-free DNA (cffDNA) from maternal blood and plasma. Before the development of this non-invasive prenatal diagnostic test, patients were placed at much higher risk and maternal plasma was routinely discarded as waste.

In an earlier decision the district court ruled that the method claims were patent ineligible and an – apparently reluctant  – Federal Circuit agreed in Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc. 788 F.3d 1377 (Fed Cir. 2015). Judge Linn, for example, wrote that the innovation deserves patent protection, but also that the “sweeping language of the test” established in Mayo v. Prometheus requires a determination that the claims are patent ineligible. Read More

Patent Law, Expertise, and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

by Zachary Shapiro

Since its creation in 1982, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) has been a magnet for controversy and criticism. While I do not align myself with those critics, it would be foolish to not acknowledge the problems that are present with the CAFC. For instance, for the vast majority of federal law, when law develops differently in different circuits, the Supreme Court is able to observe those developments, and decide which interpretation is most desirable. Because the CAFC has sole jurisdiction over patent law appeals, patent law is not subject to these circuit splits. While splits temporarily hamper uniform justice, they do allow for experimentation, enabling different legal interpretations to be tested in real life. In this way, splits can allow an appellate body to make a more informed decision regarding which interpretation should be followed.

The lack of circuit splits in patent law can be problematic, given accusations that the CAFC has succumbed to a form of institutional capture by the patent lobby.[1] Critics highlight the CAFC’s decision in Amazon[2] and eBay[3] as evidence of this capture. In Amazon, the CAFC found a broad presumption of irreparable harm, allowing for broad extension of preliminary injunctions in future cases of patent infringement (even though they overturned the injunction at issue in the case). This patent-holder-friendly standard was ultimately overruled in eBay,[4] after the CAFC applied its nearly automatic injunction standard. The Supreme Court overturned this decision, and dialed back the presumption, in large part because it was seen as too favorable to patent holders.

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