Zubik v. Burwell, Part 2: The Religious Objectors Who Cried Wolf

Photo: wolf
Flickr/Creative Commons—Luke Jones

By Gregory M. Lipper

(Read Part 1, Part 3Part 4Part 5, and Part 6 of this series)

Yesterday, I evaluated the unprecedented arguments, by the plaintiffs in Zubik v. Burwell and its companion cases, that the process for seeking a religious exemption from the contraceptive-coverage regulations itself burdened the objectors’ religious exericse. Today, I move to a more basic question: Are these idiosyncratic claims sincere?

Like all free-exercise provisions, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act protects only sincere religious beliefs; it does not permit challengers to cloak ideological or financial objections in religious garb. Insincerity can reveal itself in several ways: prior inconsistent conduct, claims that are suspiciously timed, or outright admissions of an ulterior motive. The RFRA challenges to the contraceptive coverage regulations—and especially the accommodation—have presented several of these elements. But the government, in resisting these RFRA challenges, has not challenged the plaintiffs’ sincerity.

That said, there are several reasons to doubt the sincerity of several plaintiffs’ claims, and to see these lawsuits as an exercise in politics arising from broader conservative and religious opposition to the Obama administration’s positions on issues such as healthcare reform, stem cell research, abortion, and marriage equality. This apparent insincerity provides yet another reason to reject the latest round of RFRA challenges to the contraceptive accommodation.

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Zubik v. Burwell, Part 1: Why Paperwork Does Not Burden Religious Exercise

Photo: IUD
Flickr/Creative Commons—mara

By Gregory M. Lipper

(Read Part 2, Part 3Part 4Part 5, and Part 6 of this series)

Birth control is back at the high court. On March 23, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in Zubik v. Burwell and its six companion cases. Despite what you may have heard, religious objectors—whether they are nuns or Notre Dame—are not required to distribute birth control. On the contrary, an accommodation enables religious objectors to opt out of offering contraceptive coverage to their employees; once the objectors request the accommodation, the government arranges for the objectors’ insurance companies or plan administrators to provide the coverage—at no cost to either the objectors or their students and employees. But does this accommodation itself violate objectors’ free-exercise rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act?

No, say eight of the nine federal appeals courts to consider the question. These courts have rejected the argument that by opting out of providing contraceptive coverage, objectors’ religious exercise is substantially burdened because the government arranges for a third party to pick up the slack. Read More