Category: Doctor-Patient Relationship

The Capacity of Surrogate Decision-Makers

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During my many years in healthcare as a clinician, researcher and hospital ethics consultant, I am dismayed by how little relative attention is given to ensuring that surrogate decision-makers (or “proxies”) have the “capacity” to make sound medical decisions for adult patients without decision-making capacity. Some attention has been given to this in the literature, but not a lot. And, practically, it is routine in most clinical situations to defer to a proxy without much assessment of his/her capabilities.

For example, it has been demonstrated through many empirical studies that family members experience high distress when loved ones are admitted to ICUs, quite understandably — many families experience such high distress that decision-making abilities can be compromised. Others, even if distress is well-managed, are simply not aware of the patients’ previously stated wishes, to enable them to make decisions based upon substituted judgment. And, still others may not know enough of the medical situation to make good decisions based upon the patient’s best interests. Then, sadly, we also have a portion of proxies who may not want to keep the best interests of the patient at heart — in fact, I have done research among people with cancer who are also suffering from domestic violence from their primary caregiver (and presumed proxy). In these situations, the proxy may actually want to cause harm to the patient. Or, another example is when the harm may not be intended, but the proxy makes decisions based upon their own needs. An example is a proxy who chooses to keep a person in a terminal condition on life-support for their own financial gain (for pension checks to keep coming, for example).

We need to pay more attention to the capabilities of health care proxies. For example, in addition to encouraging clinicians to assess patients’ decision-making capabilities, clinicians should also be assessing the proxies’ decision-making abilities – early in the process. However, to my knowledge, there are no clear methods, guidelines, policies or laws “removing” established proxies from their posts as decision-makers (aside from taking the person to court, which is often impractical), when their judgment seems compromised. Clinicians are often left without guidance. Perhaps folks in clinical bioethics can help establish some clear standards for proxy decision-making, which might serve as a guide for clinicians, but also for future policy development. Just some initial thoughts…

Twitter Round-Up (11/25-12/1)

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By Casey Thomson

From policy adoption at the federal level to debate over the health concerns of political figures, this week’s round-up focuses largely on the news for bioethics and health law in the realm of politics.

  • Dan Vorhaus (@genomicslawyer) posted a feature on the history of gene patent litigation and implications for next-generation sequencing technologies. (11/26)  He also included a link summarizing key information on H.R.6118, newly passed in the House and Senate and now being presented to the President. Otherwise known as the Taking Essential Steps for Testing (TEST) Act 2012, the bill gives the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) “greater flexibility in enforcing CLIA [Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments] proficiency testing violations” (as noted by Vorhaus). (11/26)
  • Daniel Goldberg (@prof_goldberg) included a post on the inequality in self-rated health as considered by gender. The study, done in Spain, found that females’ lower sense of self-rated health is a reflection of the higher burden of disease in women, and encouraged systems of health to reconsider the approach towards afflictions with lesser impact on mortality that are possibly receiving less attention than is deserved. (11/26)
  • Daniel Goldberg (@prof_goldberg) additionally included a report on the problems parents with disabilities are facing in terms of retaining (or even gaining) their right to be a parent. Such bias against parents, the article notes, may not recognize that ensuring essential support may be all that is needed to discourage problems or eradicate risks for the majority of cases. (11/26)
  • Frank Pasquale (@FrankPasquale) linked to a blog post on the recent protests by AIDS activists in the office of House Speaker John Boehner. The protesters, stripped naked in order to reveal the painted “AIDS Cuts Kill” written on their chests, were there to protest the possible cuts to HIV/AIDS program funding that may follow a fiscal cliff deal.  (11/28)
  • Arthur Caplan (@ArthurCaplan) featured his talk with Boston Public Radio on the fine line politicians must walk when balancing their struggle with a health crisis along with the responsibilities of being a public official. The recent health concerns facing Boston’s Mayor Thomas Menino served as inspiration for this discussion. (11/28)
  • Frank Pasquale (@FrankPasquale) added a news article detailing the recent speech made by principal deputy national coordinator David Muntz of HHS’ Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology. Muntz, in addition to discussing the need to better incorporate technology for fostering stronger communication between patient and doctor, mentioned some striking statistics: “only 15% of patients have renewed a prescription online,” while “just 10% have a personal health record.” (11/29)
  • Arthur Caplan (@ArthurCaplan) posted a link to a new feature on concierge medicine, where appointments can be paid for solely through cash and not through insurance. While previously considered an option only for the rich, concierge medicine has possible implications for the greater body of patients: as the article noted, it may become a more viable option especially as threats of regulation and backlash in a doctor shortage encourage traditionally high-priced firms to backtrack. (11/29)
  • Arthur Caplan (@ArthurCaplan) also shared a video by Canadian comedian Rick Mercer on getting flu shots. (12/1)

Note: As mentioned in previous posts, retweeting should not be considered as an endorsement of or agreement with the content of the original tweet.

The New Diagnostic Scan for Alzheimer’s Disease

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[Ed. Note: We’re happy to announce that after a great month of guest blogging, Chris Robertson will be joining Bill of Health as a regular contributor.]

By Christopher Robertson

The New York Times brings us an interesting story about a new brain scan technology that allows the diagnosis of Alzheimer’s Disease.  Below the fold, I sketch a few interesting themes for health law, including the FDA’s authority over the practice of medicine, the use of blinding to improve clinical decision making, the value of a clinical diagnosis for an untreatable condition, and the problems of pre-existing conditions clauses in long-term care insurance. Read More

Overdose Update: Celebrity Edition

Temple University Center for Public Health Law Research 1 Comment

By Scott Burris

You’ve probably heard about the good news/bad news experience of Stephanie Bongiovi, daughter of rocker Jon Bon Jovi. A college student, she ODed on heroin, but help was summoned and she’s going to be fine. The (temporary) bad news for her (and longer term for others in her plight) is that she and a companion were arrested IN SPITE of a recent New York Good Samaritan 911 law passed explicitly to encourage people to call for help.

There are some technicalities and prerequisites, so if you want to see the law it’s available on LawAtlas. But if she or her companion sought help, and absent a hyper-technical reading of the statute (it literally does not protect a victim unable to seek help), the charges should never have been filed and should be dropped. The problem for the rest of us is that these laws only work if people at an OD scene know about them and trust them. High profile arrests like this are — and for once I think there might be some truth to this claim — sending a message not to seek help.

Meanwhile, Leo Beletsky, Jody Rich and Alex Walley have a fine little piece in JAMA that thoroughly catalogues the removable barriers to OD prevention. The table alone is worth thousands of words, which is nice because JAMA’s editors were pretty tight on the word limit despite the importance of the topic.

Training Doctors, The Importance of Tx Intensity and Patient Preferences?

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The Dartmouth Atlas of Health Care recently published a report entitled, “What Kind of Physician Will You Be?: Variation in Health Care and Its Importance for Residency Training.” (2012; https://www.dartmouthatlas.org/pages/residency).  Briefly, this report analyzes Medicare data to create indexes and variables used to describe varying levels of treatment intensity, particularly at the end of life, for 23 top U.S. medical centers. This report is targeted to medical students who are choosing their residency programs, hoping that prospective residents look at a wider-array of factors, including: how well these hospitals utilize effective, proven health care interventions; to what extent the care they provide is dependent on supply-induced demand; and how well the hospitals allow for patient preferences in treatment plans.

This report grabbed my attention given that I conduct research in end-of-life (EOL) care, and I am sympathetic to efforts to improve the quality of care provided to people with advanced and terminal diseases. I am also quite interested in how our medical system can change the culture of medical care to provide higher-quality EOL, and to reduce the use of often ineffective and invasive medical interventions, particularly through hospitalization and ICU admissions. The education of residents seems like a good place to start in changing the current intensity and specialty-driven culture.

However, the gaps in this report compromise its arguments and potentially reduce its effectiveness. I will only highlight two here.

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The Prescription Drug Abuse and Overdose Crisis: Focus on the Supply Chain

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By Scott Burris

There’s so much we still don’t know about the prescription opioid problem. The partial remedies advanced so far reflect this:

  • Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs, which in essence define the problem as doctor-shopping patients;
  • treatment guidelines, which define the problem as doctors without expertise; and
  • crackdowns on “pill-mills,” which see the issue as physician corruption. Each of these diagnoses has an element of truth, but not necessarily enough to make the treatments effective.

One huge part of the problem has gotten far too little attention: the pharmaceutical supply chain where all these drugs start and along which they are distributed. Now, John Coleman, a former DEA officer, has given us a thorough and compelling primer on the supply chain, describing it and showing where the pressure points are for action. He is not happy about what he sees: DEA is overwhelmed, and too secretive with its data;  and the distributors are too interested in profits and far too unwilling to police paying customers. But he also sees room for action and even hope. This article is well worth a read if you are interested in the overdose problem and how to solve it:

Coleman, John J. “The Supply Chain of Medicinal Controlled Substances: Addressing the Achilles Heel of Drug Diversion.” Journal of Pain and Palliative Care Pharmacotherapy 26, no. 3 (2012): 233-50.

P.S. — One of the hopeful signs he sees was Florida’s legislation beefing up state-level monitoring and controls. This takes me back to the successful Wisconsin Cancer Pain Initiative in the 70s and 80s, which articulated the Principle of Balance in drug control and demonstrated that it was possible to have good access to pain medicine and effective control. In those days, David Joranson, the state drug controller, worked closely with DEA, using state regulatory authority to shut down docs and pharmacies who were acting outside the law. The possibility of history repeating itself is a ray of sunlight in the cloudy skies of this issue. (If you are interested in the story, here’s one place to start: Joranson, D., and J. L. Dahl. “Achieving Balance in Drug Policy: The Wisconsin Model.” In Advances in Pain Research and Therapy, edited by CS Hill Jr. and WS Fields. 197-204. New York: Raven Press, 1989.)

Art Caplan: MA Should Legalize Physician-Assisted Suicide

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Weighing in on Question 2, Massachusetts’ ballot initiative on physician-assisted suicide, Art Caplan says we should vote “yes”:

Mass. should legalize physician-assisted suicide

Of the numerous ballot initiatives that will be decided at the state level on Tuesday, none is more hotly contested than the Massachusetts bill to decide whether to legalize physician-assisted suicide. The citizens of Massachusetts, my home state, should vote to legalize.

The proposed measure allows terminally ill patients to be given access to lethal drugs. A terminally ill patient is defined as someone with six months or less to live. The patient’s terminal diagnosis and mental competency must be attested to by two doctors. Patients would have to make a request to their doctor twice orally and once in writing. The written request would have to be witnessed.

Yet even with such restrictive conditions, opponents of the proposal say doctors should never, as a matter of professional ethics, intentionally hasten the death of one of their patients, even one who is terminally ill. The codes of medicine and nursing ethics reject helping patients die.

Keep reading…

Pharmacy Compounding: Federal Law in Brief

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by Jonathan J. Darrow

Until recently, most ordinary people had never heard of “pharmacy compounding.”  Then, a number of deaths and illnesses caused by a drug that was compounded in a Framingham, Massachusetts pharmacy propelled drug compounding to the national spotlight (see, e.g., Denise Grady et al., Scant Oversight of Drug Maker in Fatal Meningitis Outbreak, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 2012).

Compounding is the practice of preparing a drug for an individual patient’s needs, and is used when those needs cannot be met by a mass-produced drug.  See Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357, 360 (2002).  For example, if a patient is allergic to a particular excipient (inactive ingredient) in an FDA-approved medicine, a doctor may order a special compounding pharmacy to prepare the medicine without that excipient. Because of the very small scale of compounding, Congress in 1997 attempted to exempt (via 21 U.S.C. § 353a) the industry from a number of provisions of the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act, including the requirement to submit a new drug application prior to interstate sale (21 U.S.C. § 355), the requirement that the drug labeling bear “adequate directions for use” (21 U.S.C. § 352(f)(1)), and the need to strictly follow good manufacturing practices, or GMP (see 21 U.S.C. § 351(a)(2)(B)).  A number of controls on compounding were included, however, such as the requirement that there be a valid prescription from a licensed practitioner (21 U.S.C. § 353a(a)(1)), that the drug be compounded by a licensed pharmacist (or physician) (21 U.S.C. § 353a(a)(1)), and that the drug be compounded from ingredients that meet certain quality standards (21 U.S.C. § 353a(b)(1)(A)–(B)).

However, § 353a—and with it, all of the provisions and exemptions just mentioned—was held unconstitutional in its entirety in Western States Medical Center v. Shalala, 238 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d 535 U.S. 357 (2002), on the basis of certain restrictions on free speech that were also contained within the statute and which, according to the Ninth Circuit, could not be severed from the remaining provisions because “Congress intended to exempt compounding from the FDCA’s requirements only in return for a prohibition on promotion of specific compounded drugs.” See 535 U.S. at 366. Thereafter, the FDA promulgated a policy by which it would primarily “defer to state authorities regarding less significant violations” but would enforce a number of provisions relating to ingredient standards, unapproved substances, commercial scale production, adulteration, and promotion.  The FDA made clear that its enforcement activities “need not be limited to” these or any particular areas, however, thus negating any expectations that Congress’ now-invalidated exemptions might nevertheless provide a safe harbor through the weight of influence, if not law. Since then, the FDA has in fact exercised oversight of compounding pharmacies, as is evident from the handfuls of warning letters that it sends to non-compliant facilities each year.  These letters have addressed, for example, promotion that made unsubstantiated efficacy claims, contamination, and the large-scale manufacture of what were essentially copies of FDA-approved drugs.

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Politics in Practice: Intense Conversations in Intensive Care

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By Erin Talati

As Holly Lynch describes in her recent post, the upcoming election brings a number of bioethics questions directly to the public. Two of the three ballot questions in Massachusetts invite discussion and debate on the controversial issues of physician-assisted suicide and the medical use of marijuana. The introduction of these issues as ballot initiatives offers physicians the opportunity for rich discussion on important topics with their patients. But, how much should physicians and other health care providers share with patients regarding their own views on these issues?
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Physician-Assisted Suicide in MA

Holly Fernandez Lynch 1 Comment

Next Tuesday, those of us registered in Massachusetts will have the opportunity to vote on “Question 2” – prescribing medication to end life, otherwise known as physician-assisted suicide.  As described by the state secretary, “This proposed law would allow a physician licensed in Massachusetts to prescribe medication, at a terminally ill patient’s request, to end that patient’s life. To qualify, a patient would have to be an adult resident who (1) is medically determined to be mentally capable of making and communicating health care decisions; (2) has been diagnosed by attending and consulting physicians as having an incurable, irreversible disease that will, within reasonable medical judgment, cause death within six months; and (3) voluntarily expresses a wish to die and has made an informed decision.”  There are, of course, a number of other safeguards built in, such as the need to make the request twice, separated by 15 days, in the presence of witnesses.  However, there could probably be stronger safeguards to protect individuals who are experiencing depression and anxiety, and might have preferable alternatives to physician-assisted death.

The proposed law is similar to measures already in place in Oregon and Washington state, where statistics show relatively low uptake and certainly not the sort of slippery slope that critics seem to be worried about.  In today’s NY Times, however, Zeke Emanuel describes 4 myths about physician-assisted suicide that might give some pause to people like me who plan to vote “Yes” on Question 2.  In the end, though, it strikes me that preserving room for maximal choice in these difficult end-of-life situations is for the best.

Without delving into the merits, which has been done very well elsewhere, let me just make a quick note about something else that struck me re: Question 2, which was the pamphlet of materials I received at home about the ballot measure.  It came from the state secretary, had an excellent, understandable summary of the law and what it would do, and included brief statements for and against written by selected advocates.  I thought this was an incredible mechanism to promote informed voting and deliberative democracy – and because I always have human subjects research ethics on the brain, it made me think of the possible ways this approach could be adapted to improve informed consent.  Perhaps traditional consent forms could be accompanied by a brief neutral statement about a study from the IRB, followed by short statements pro and con about the decision to participate. Just a thought.

And finally, one more note: we’re having a bioethics-heavy election day in Massachusetts this year.  Question 3 is about whether we should eliminate state criminal and civil penalties for the medical use of marijuana by qualifying patients.