The Evolution of Public Health Law Research

By: Scott Burris, JD

Law has been used to protect and promote public health from the early days of European colonization of North America. Quarantine statutes and orders are reported from the mid-17th century. The 1793 yellow fever epidemic in Philadelphia, where our office is based, inspired the federal government’s first public health statute, authorizing relocation of the capital in the event of an outbreak.

By the mid-19th century, sanitarians like Boston’s own Lemuel Shattuck were articulating the idea that a considerable proportion of death and illness was preventable, and arguing that it was moral, feasible, and economical for the state to do the preventing. Law was a primary tool for prevention, and throughout the 19th century, and into the early twentieth, the extent and limitations of federal, state and local public health authority was litigated, debated in legislatures and defined in voluminous treatises by scholars like Freund, Tiedeman and Tobey.

And then, it got quiet.

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Broadening “Innovation Law & Policy” (and “Human Subjects Research”)

By Michelle Meyer

In legal scholarship and education, innovation law and policy is virtually synonymous with intellectual property in general, and with patent law in particular. This is curious and, I think, misguided. We expend considerable effort designing optimal incentives for innovation. We expend similar effort ensuring that socially useful knowledge, once produced, is widely and accurately disseminated. But if knowledge-producing activities themselves are suboptimally regulated, neither upstream incentives to engage in them nor downstream mechanisms to disseminate their fruits will much matter.

In Regulating the Production of Knowledge: Research Risk-Benefit Analysis and the Heterogeneity Problem, I

critically examine[] that regulatory framework, adopted by more than one dozen federal agencies in the U.S. and many other countries, which governs the vast majority of those knowledge-producing activities that have the greatest potential to affect human welfare: research involving human beings, or “human subjects research” (HSR). [The Article] focuses on the primary actors in the regulation of HSR — licensing committees called Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) which, before each study may proceed, must find that its risks to participants are “reasonable in relation to” its expected benefits for both participants and society. It argues for a particular interpretation of this risk-benefit standard and, drawing on scholarship in psychology, economics, neuroscience and other fields, argues that participant heterogeneity prevents IRBs from carrying out their regulatory duty. Instead, the regulatory system implicitly responds to the heterogeneity problem with risk aversion that is costly not only to researchers and society but, critically, to would-be research participants. The Article concludes by laying out the policy options that remain in the wake of the heterogeneity problem’s intractability: continuing the legal fiction of risk-benefit analysis, honestly embracing the heterogeneity problem and its costs, or jettisoning IRB risk-benefit analysis. A companion Article develops the possibility of the third option.

HSR is not, of course, unknown to the legal academy. Read More