Legal questions about end-of-life decisions have moved on since the paradigm-setting battles in the 1980’s and 1990’s. It is now clearly established that a competent person has the right to refuse needed medical treatment and to make binding advance directives about treatment if she becomes incompetent. Physician-assisted suicide is a policy choice for states, not a constitutional right. National debate now focuses on providing palliative care rather than high-tech interventions to prolong fading life. Cost reduction consistent with these values remain an omnipresent dilemma.
Sticky legal issues, however, remain, particularly with regard to the care of incompetent patients, as a Minnesota trial court recently reminded us (In re the Guardianship of Jeffers J. Tschumy, Hennepin County District Court, Fourth Judicial District, #27-GC-PR-07-496, October 18, 2012). The question before the court was whether a broad grant of power to a guardian to make decisions about consenting or not consenting to medical treatment includes the power to have treatment terminated that will result in the ward’s death. While allowing treatment to be withheld in that case, the court decided that only a judge, not the guardian on his own, could make that decision. An appeal is now pending.
The court’s opinion catalogued the main arguments for each position before coming down on the side of judicial review. Allowing the guardian to decide without court review was supported by the broad language of powers granted to guardians—to make decision about providing or withholding medical treatment—and the legislature’s failure to list termination of treatment as something that was explicitly denied the guardian (as it had done with certain other procedures). It would also be quicker and less cumbersome, expensive, and burdensome both for judges and family members to have guardians empowered to terminate treatment.
On the other side were the argument that the awesome power to end life was not specifically granted the guardian, and the fact that guardians are often appointed years before such decisions must be made. At that time of appointment there is usually little thought of ending the life at some future time, and guardians so appointed may have not expertise or training in such matters. The court concluded that until the legislature decided otherwise, a guardian would have to return to court for permission to end treatment that would result in the ward’s death.