Reminder: Tomorrow, Institutional Financial Conflicts of Interest in Research Universities

Friday, November 2, 2012
8:30am – 6:30pm (reception to follow)
Milstein Conference Rooms, 2nd Floor
Wasserstein Hall
1585 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA

The Petrie-Flom Center and the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics will be co-sponsoring a day-long symposium organized by Dr. David Korn on institutional financial conflicts of interest in research universities. The speaker line-up is incredible, including Derek Bok and Zeke Emanuel, among other experts from academia and government.

For more information, and to register (attendance is free), check out the symposium webpage.  We hope to see you there!

FDA Reprimands Genentech for “Drastically Overstat[ing] the Efficacy of Tarceva”

by Jonathan J. Darrow

On October 3, 2012, the FDA’s Division of Professional Drug Promotion issued an untitled letter to Genentech in connection with its cancer drug Tarceva.  Tarceva (erlotinib) was approved in 2004 for the treatment of non-small cell lung cancer, and has since been approved, in combination with Gemzar (gemcitabine), for the treatment of pancreatic cancer. Its approval letter reported a tumor response that was 9 times greater with Tarceva than with placebo (0.9% in placebo versus 8.9% in Tarceva), but relatively modest improvements in 1-year survival rates: approximately 8 of 10 patients on placebo did not survive 1 year, while about 7 of 10 patients on Tarceva did not survive (see page 6, line 102 of the approval letter).  A 2005 New York Times article was less than enthusiastic about Tarceva’s efficacy, noting that it (along with several other cancer drugs that were new at the time) “help[s] most patients only marginally . . . .”  Despite its modest efficacy, Tarceva was reported in the same New York Times article to cost almost $31,000 per year.  A number of patents are listed in the FDA’s Orange Book as covering Tarceva until 2020.

The recent untitled letter accused Genentech’s promotional materials of misleadingly indicating that Tarceva in combination with gemcitabine extended overall survival by 3.7 months in comparison with gemcitabine alone, when the actual increase in survival was only about 12 days.  The FDA characterized the discrepancy as “drastically overstat[ing] the efficacy of Tarceva.”  (The figure of 3.7 months was derived, according to the FDA, “from a retrospective, exploratory subgroup analysis that does not provide substantial evidence to support the efficacy claims cited . . . .”). In addition, the front cover of one of the promotional materials in question contained an image of an hourglass positioned on its side, presented with the claim: “Extending survival for moments that matter.”  Although the claim with its associated image may be literally true (“moments” is left undefined), the FDA characterized the image and claim as “drastically overstat[ing] the overall survival benefit for patients” because it “strongly suggests that time is standing still for the cancer patient because of Tarceva therapy.”  The FDA noted a number of other instances of misleading overstatement of efficacy or minimization of risk.

The October 3 Tarceva letter brings to 23 the total number of Drug Marketing and Advertising Warning Letters (and untitled letters) listed by the FDA’s Office of Drug Promotion as having been sent this year.

Call for Papers – Petrie-Flom Center Annual Conference: The Food and Drug Administration in the 21st Century

We are pleased to announce plans for our annual conference, this year entitled: “The Food and Drug Administration in the 21st Century.”  This one and a half day event will take place Friday and Saturday, May 3-4, 2013, at Harvard Law School in Cambridge, Massachusetts. For details on the event and the call for proposals, see the Call for Papers/Presentations. Abstracts are due no later than December 10, 2012.

FDA’s New Dance with Big Pharma: Are Patients the Band?

Efthimios Parasidis

One week prior to the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in the health care cases, Democrats and Republicans overwhelmingly voted in favor of health-related legislation (387-5 House; 96-1 Senate).  Industry and HHS were quick to congratulate our elected officials on a triumphant bipartisan achievement, while the FDA enthusiastically welcomed its latest collaboration with Big Pharma.  Lobby groups boasted of their ability to “craft” legislation with FDA and praised the “unprecedented level of public input” into the new law.

We should all be concerned.

Read More

Innovative Approaches to Pharmaceutical Innovation: Alternative R&D Mechanisms

by Adriana Lee Benedict

Earlier this year, the World Health Organization’s Consultative Expert Working Group on Research and Development: Financing and Coordination (CEWG) issued a report calling for, inter alia, increased support for innovative pharmaceutical R&D funding mechanisms.  Although lack of financing has posed a challenge to implementation of alternative approaches to R&D, the increasing pace of pharmaceutical innovation has certainly spurred significant innovation in this realm.  These approaches can be broadly categorized into “push” and “pull” incentive mechanisms.

“Pull” mechanisms–such as advance market commitments, prize funds, and expedited regulatory review—reward R&D outcomes by facilitating translation of innovation to marketable products.  Several “pull” mechanisms have yet to be tested.  For instance, pay-for-performance mechanisms, such as those contemplated by the proposed Health Impact Fund, would use government and donor financing pay for performance in lieu of normal profits gained from market exclusivity.  Other untested ideas include patent buy-outs, transferable IP rights and market exclusivity, reduction of patent length, and “optimal hedging to smooth public health expenditures”.

“Push” mechanisms, on the other hand, fund R&D at earlier stages. Patent pools, for instance, bring patents into a collectively owned and managed pool that can issue voluntary licenses to generic companies for product development. Other “push” mechanisms that have seen some success include targeted disease-specific funding, health innovation networks for the “Global South”, capacity-building and technology transfer initiatives, open-source and crowd-sourced R&D for neglected and rare diseases, and private-public product development partnerships.  “Push” mechanisms that have been proposed but not yet tested include taxes on patents; proportional, tiered or stage-specific partial prizes; and making undisclosed clinical trial data an international public good. Innovative financial proposals that de-link R&D investment from profits include linking donor funding to technology transfer commitments, cost sharing for clinical trials, for-profit investment partnerships, neglected disease and global health tax credits, and additional fees on patent applications (called “Green IP”).

Read More

Intellectual Property in Investment Agreements: More “Teeth” for Foreign Investors’ IP Rights, Less for Access to Medicines

By Adriana Benedict

Last week, Public Citizen published a Health GAP analysis entitled “Leaked TPP Investment Chapter Presents a Grave Threat to Access to Medicines,” in which Professor Brook Baker explains four ways in which access to medicines is compromised by the USTR’s leaked investment chapter proposal for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement.  The problematic provisions he identifies — inclusion of intellectual property (IP) in the definition of “investment”, ambiguous scope of minimum standards of treatment, inadequate exceptions and limitations for public interest measures, and performance requirement limitations preventing development of local and sustainable production—are not new, but have been included either implicitly or explicitly in countless bilateral investment treaties (BITs) (including the U.S. Model BIT) and the investment chapters of free trade agreements (FTAs) (including virtually all US FTAs and the proposed EU-India FTA).  Such inclusion gives more “teeth” to foreign investors’ IP rights, but what of access to medicines?

Read More

Is the USTR Trading Away Doctors’ Rights to Freely Perform Medical Procedures?

By Adriana Lee Benedict 

The 14th round of negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA, a multilateral trade agreement currently being negotiated by the USTR and 10 other countries) is currently underway in Leesburg, VA.  Last month, KEI posted a brief video blog about an interesting provision (Article 8.2) of the TTPA’s leaked draft IP chapter calling for patentability of diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods.  Critically, KEI pointed out that current US law (35 U.S.C. 287(c))—which was amended after widespread concern from physicians’ associations regarding the adverse public health effects of medical method patent liability were brought to light with Pallin v. Singer, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1050 (D. Vt. 1995)—immunizes medical practitioners from patent infringement suits concerning medical methods, although the draft TPPA provision makes no such exception.  The proposed provision is also contrary to Article 27(3) of TRIPS and Article 1709(3)(a) of NAFTA, all of which allow countries to exclude such medical methods from patentability, as well as Rule 39.1 of the 1970 PCT, which exempts International Searching Authorities from having to conduct patent searches relating to medical methods.

Medical professional societies, including the WMA, AMA, AAOS, ACOG and ASRC, have also opposed medical procedure patents on ethical grounds.  The WMA has explained that patents are not necessary to incentivize innovation in medical procedures: “Unlike device development, which requires investment in engineers, production processes, and factories, development of medical procedures consists of physicians attaining and perfecting manual and intellectual skills… physicians already have both obligations to engage in these professional activities as well as rewards for doing so.”  The WMA has also noted a number of adverse effects on access to medical care resulting from medical procedure patents, including higher costs, fewer physicians available and/or willing to perform patented procedure, and less innovation in medical procedures.

So what does this mean for the TPPA negotiating parties? Read More

Generic Drugs: Grabbing a Bigger Slice

by Jonathan J. Darrow

The expiration of the patent on $11-billion-per-year Lipitor® (atorvastatin calcium) last November received wide media attention and was eagerly greeted by consumers, reflecting public excitement that seems to have not yet dissipated.  In the following months, prices “plunged from about $175 a month for Lipitor to about $15 for generics,” according to a recent article in the New York Times. At times it felt as if legions of consumer Davids had triumphed over a corporate Goliath.

Although the public’s euphoria over the availability of cheaper generic versions of drugs is an understandable cause for celebration, price decreases in themselves should not be mistaken for net gains to society.  The societal gains represented by new drugs, to the extent there are any gains at all, come from the new therapeutic benefits that those drugs offer to patients. The entrance of generic competition, on the other hand, merely represents a shift of wealth from one unit of society (originator manufacturers) to another (patients, and also generic drug companies and insurers).

While individual consumers may care little about “net gains to society,” policy-makers should care: If there are no net gains to society from the high prices preceding patent expiration, then perhaps the patent system should be abolished entirely.  That option, however, has not been a serious topic of discussion in the United States since the 1870s. Instead of debating the underlying issues, however, the public’s attention is focused on what is easiest to see: When can I pay less?  One has to wonder, however, what the innovative landscape would look like if more attention were paid to baking a bigger pie, rather than celebrating the newfound ability to grab a bigger slice.

Broadening “Innovation Law & Policy” (and “Human Subjects Research”)

By Michelle Meyer

In legal scholarship and education, innovation law and policy is virtually synonymous with intellectual property in general, and with patent law in particular. This is curious and, I think, misguided. We expend considerable effort designing optimal incentives for innovation. We expend similar effort ensuring that socially useful knowledge, once produced, is widely and accurately disseminated. But if knowledge-producing activities themselves are suboptimally regulated, neither upstream incentives to engage in them nor downstream mechanisms to disseminate their fruits will much matter.

In Regulating the Production of Knowledge: Research Risk-Benefit Analysis and the Heterogeneity Problem, I

critically examine[] that regulatory framework, adopted by more than one dozen federal agencies in the U.S. and many other countries, which governs the vast majority of those knowledge-producing activities that have the greatest potential to affect human welfare: research involving human beings, or “human subjects research” (HSR). [The Article] focuses on the primary actors in the regulation of HSR — licensing committees called Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) which, before each study may proceed, must find that its risks to participants are “reasonable in relation to” its expected benefits for both participants and society. It argues for a particular interpretation of this risk-benefit standard and, drawing on scholarship in psychology, economics, neuroscience and other fields, argues that participant heterogeneity prevents IRBs from carrying out their regulatory duty. Instead, the regulatory system implicitly responds to the heterogeneity problem with risk aversion that is costly not only to researchers and society but, critically, to would-be research participants. The Article concludes by laying out the policy options that remain in the wake of the heterogeneity problem’s intractability: continuing the legal fiction of risk-benefit analysis, honestly embracing the heterogeneity problem and its costs, or jettisoning IRB risk-benefit analysis. A companion Article develops the possibility of the third option.

HSR is not, of course, unknown to the legal academy. Read More