Graph with number of biosimilar approvals on the X axis and years from 1970 until 2018 on the Y axis. The line on the graph represents a generally upward trend.

The Rise of Biosimilars: Success of the BPCIA? (Part III)

By Jonathan Darrow

This is Part III in a series exploring the history, challenges, and opportunities in the regulation of biosimilars, or biologic medical products that are very similar to already approved biological medicines.  Part III considers a path forward in the regulation of biologics.  For Part I, click here.  For Part II click here.

A Path Forward

The small number of biosimilar approvals compared to generic drug approvals cannot establish the failure of the BPCIA due to differences in industry familiarity with each follow-on pathway, the number of reference products available for copying, patient population sizes, patent barriers, and drug costs. The later arrival of US laws and guidance documents—not inadequate legal design—is the most straightforward explanation of why the first US biosimilar approvals were delayed compared to those in Europe.

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Graph with number of biosimilar approvals on the X axis and years from 1970 until 2018 on the Y axis. The line on the graph represents a generally upward trend.

The Rise of Biosimilars: Success of the BPCIA? (Part II)

By Jonathan Darrow

This is Part II in a series exploring the history, challenges, and opportunities in the regulation of biosimilars, or biologic medical products that are very similar to already approved biological medicines.  Part II covers some key considerations and factors that impact the biologics market and regulation.  For Part I, click here.

Reference Products Available for Copying in 1984

Because most post-1962 drugs enjoyed a 17-year patent term (changed to 20 years in 1995), there was little need for an abbreviated pathway in the years immediately following the Kefauver-Harris Amendments. But as patents expired, increasing numbers of post-1962 drugs became available for copying yet were ineligible as reference products under the 1970 ANDA regulations. On the eve of the Hatch-Waxman Act, Congress estimated that approximately 150 post-1962 drugs were off-patent but had no generic equivalent. This backlog of available reference products produced a surge in ANDA approvals following enactment of the new law (Exhibit 1).

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Graph with number of biosimilar approvals on the X axis and years from 1970 until 2018 on the Y axis. The line on the graph represents a generally upward trend.

The Rise of Biosimilars: Success of the BPCIA? (Part I)

By Jonathan Darrow

This is Part I in a series exploring the history, challenges, and opportunities in the regulation of biosimilars, or biologic medical products that are very similar to already-approved biological medicines.  This Part briefly covers the history of American regulation of biologics and touches briefly on the European experience.

The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA), part of the 2010 Affordable Care Act, sought to drive down prices for biologics, much as the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act did for small-molecule drugs. By allowing manufacturers of follow-on products to rely in part on the clinical data of the brand-name reference product, both laws were designed to lower development costs and attract competitors.

Since the BPCIA’s enactment, however, scholars have compared it unfavorably to the Hatch-Waxman Act, criticized its pathway as “obstructed” and lacking in sufficient incentives, lamented the scarce approvals it has produced, and recommended that it be “abandoned.” Although criticisms of the law are not without basis, their collective implication—that the BPCIA is irredeemably defective and will never yield robust competition—may be wrong.

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close up of an open book

Monthly Round-Up of What to Read on Pharma Law and Policy

By Ameet Sarpatwari, Charlie Lee, Frazer Tessema, and Aaron S. Kesselheim

Each month, members of the Program On Regulation, Therapeutics, And Law (PORTAL) review the peer-reviewed medical literature to identify interesting empirical studies, policy analyses, and editorials on health law and policy issues relevant to current or potential future work in the Division.

Below are the abstracts/summaries for papers identified from the month of December. The selections feature topics ranging from potential Medicare savings on inhaler prescriptions through use of negotiated prices and a defined formulary, to evaluation of the REMS for extended-release/long-acting opioids, to the costs of medication non-adherence in adults with atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease in the US. A full posting of abstracts/summaries of these articles may be found on our website. Read More

Stack of colorful books in front of a wood paneled wall

Monthly Round-Up of What to Read on Pharma Law and Policy

By Ameet Sarpatwari, Charlie Lee, Frazer Tessema, and Aaron S. Kesselheim

Each month, members of the Program On Regulation, Therapeutics, And Law (PORTAL) review the peer-reviewed medical literature to identify interesting empirical studies, policy analyses, and editorials on health law and policy issues relevant to current or potential future work in the Division.

Below are the abstracts/summaries for papers identified from the month of September. The selections feature topics ranging from the contributions of academia and industry to lung cancer survival gains, to the savings from the EpiPen authorized generic, to the association between FDA advisory committee recommendations and agency actions. A full posting of abstracts/summaries of these articles may be found on our website.

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Blister pack of pills, but instead of bills dollar bills are rolled up in the packaging

Legal Challenges to California’s Pay-for-Delay Ban

By Phebe Hong

On October 7th, toward the end of his health care “bill-signing marathon,” Governor Gavin Newsom signed bill AB 824, making California the first state to ban pharmaceutical “pay-for-delay” deals. The new law prohibits pay-for-delay deals, which is the practice of pharmaceutical companies giving “anything of value” to generic manufacturers to keep lower-cost generic versions off the market. The measure allows civil suits to be brought against pharmaceutical companies using such payment agreements to maintain monopolies for their higher-cost brand-name drugs.

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Illustration of a cartoon man jumping from one oversized blister pack of pills to another

Stopping the Pharmaceutical “Product Hop”

By Phebe Hong

It happens every year like clockwork: Apple releases a new iPhone, and then hordes of people rush to buy it, despite still owning perfectly functional older models. We’re willing to shell out hundreds of dollars for a few extra camera features and new colors. As a result, Apple profits. A similar phenomenon is occurring in the drug industry, but with less consumer choice and more dire consequences.

“Product hopping” in the drug industry occurs when a pharmaceutical manufacturer winds down production of an old drug formulation whose patent expiration date has passed or is approaching. The company then forces or persuades patients to switch prescriptions to the drug’s new – and newly patented – formulation. A successful “product hop” extends a pharmaceutical manufacturer’s monopoly and therefore its ability to charge high prices.

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Photograph of a gavel and three open books

Monthly Round-Up of What to Read on Pharma Law and Policy

By Ameet Sarpatwari, Charlie Lee, Frazer Tessema, and Aaron S. Kesselheim

Each month, members of the Program On Regulation, Therapeutics, And Law (PORTAL) review the peer-reviewed medical literature to identify interesting empirical studies, policy analyses, and editorials on health law and policy issues relevant to current or potential future work in the Division.

Read More

hand reaching for blue pills

The Rotten U.S. Antiparasitic Drug Market

Recently, there has been a lot of media attention on galling price hikes of generic drugs.

Historically, the social contract in pharmaceutical pricing has been tolerating expensive brand-name drugs while they have been on patent (a government-granted monopoly), followed by allowing low cost generics to rush to market after patent expiration. Yet these norms are now being challenged in the setting of increased generic manufacturer consolidation and single-source generic drugs.

Probably the most well known example is the case of Martin Shkreli (the so-called “Pharma Bro”) and Turing Pharmaceuticals, which bought out the rights of pyrimethamine (Daraprim), a key treatment for Toxoplasmosis and other infectious diseases, raising the price from $13.50 per pill to $750 per pill.

Note that even the pre-price hike price is significantly more than people other countries pay. In the UK it costs only $0.66 per pill and in Australia it is $0.18 per pill.

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Tertiary Patents: An Emerging Phenomenon

By Jonathan J. Darrow

Brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers have long been known to try to protect and extend their market exclusivity periods by obtaining patents on a drug’s substance (“primary patents”) and also on its peripheral features, such as formulations or methods of manufacture (“secondary patents”). A new study describes an emerging phenomenon of “tertiary patents,” which have the potential to further delay and discourage market entry in the context of drug-device combination products.

Combination products are defined by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to include therapeutic products that combine a drug with a device, such as an inhaler or injector pen. These products can sometimes offer life-changing or life-sustaining treatment, as with naloxone (Narcan) for opioid overdose or epinephrine (EpiPen) for severe allergic reactions. In recent years, these and other similar products have been the subject of substantial controversy related to their prices and prolonged lack of generic competition.

To investigate the potential role of patents on the prices and exclusivity periods of drug-device combination products, two researchers at the Program On Regulation, Therapeutics, And Law (PORTAL) at Brigham and Women’s Hospital and Harvard Medical School (where I hold a faculty appointment) conducted a comprehensive evaluation of drug-device combination patents registered with the FDA. They found that patents related to drug delivery devices have tripled since the year 2000 and contribute a median of five years of additional market exclusivity to those products (subject, of course, to potential judicial or administrative patent invalidation). Furthermore, the researchers identified a subset of 31 products having only device patents (i.e., having no primary or secondary patents), and found that these patents were scheduled to expire a median of 17 years after FDA approval. Read More