Is “My Patient’s Agent” Always Justified?

Kelsey Berry

Is a physician always justified in acting as his or her patient’s agent?

This question is familiar to clinical and population-level bioethicists alike, though I hesitate to say that it is age-old. There are a variety of ways to approach a response to this question, as evidenced by extensive treatment of this topic in the philosophical and bioethics literature (which I will not survey here). One popular approach involves raising candidate circumstances that may justify deviations from the principal-agent relationship that obtains between physicians and patients* – for instance, ethicists might consider whether a physician is justified in deviating from acting as his or her patient’s agent under circumstances in which (a) the action that is in the best interest of the patient conflicts with the action that in the best interest of the population health, (b) the action that is in the best interests of the patient requires inefficient use of community resources on some criteria, or (c) what the patient perceives to be in his or her best interests conflicts with what the physician recommends, etc. This list is woefully inexhaustive, but it highlights a theme in this thread of argumentation. In each scenario, we’re invited to accept the initial assumption that the physician is justified, if not all of the time, at least most of the time, in acting as his or her patient’s agent. Then we are led to consider whether the candidate circumstances raised qualify as an exception to this rule.

The often-unarticulated premise, that the physician is typically justified in acting as his or her patient’s agent, is not without philosophical support from several prominent theories. We also have pragmatic reasons to begin with this premise, for there are few specific actors (to whom we can easily point) that compete with the patient for a principal-agent relationship of the type that obtains between a physician and his or her patient. Of course, other patients under care are obvious contenders, as are other potential patients. Though adjudicating between a physician’s obligations to both existing and potential patients raises interesting issues, the conflicts these principal-agent relationships give rise to still trade on the basic assumption that the physician has reason to maintain the basic fiduciary relationship in most circumstances. Read More

Sex Selection or Gender Selection? Queering the Ratio Question

I am at a fantastic event at Yale I co-organized on Intersections in Reproduction: Perspectives on Abortion, Assisted Reproductive Technologies, and Judicial Review with some amazing scholars present and excellent papers being presented. Like many people who have thought about sex selection, I would have imagined I have thought through most of the issues from most perspectives. What I love about these gatherings is that they always prove me wrong.

Today two very interesting questions were raised about a common argument raised about sex selection, the risk that it will result in unbalanced sex ratios. Our discussion, I would say, “queered” the typical claim in two interesting ways, and I am curious what others think (to be clear these were my thoughts on questions raised, not putting words in their mouths).

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Biomarker Epistemology, Cognitive Decline, and Alzheimer’s Disease

By Matthew L Baum

This past Sunday, a group of researchers reported in the journal, Nature Medicine, a preliminary technique that uses variation in blood levels of 10 fats to predict the likelihood that elderly individuals would develop mild cognitive impairment (MCI) or Alzheimer’s Disease in the following 2-3 years. The sample size was small and the results may not generalize beyond the narrow age-range and demographics of the study group (i.e. the assay is far from ready for “prime time”), but the study is an important first step towards a lower cost (vs PET imaging) and less invasive (vs spinal tap) predictive biomarker of cognitive decline*. Its publication has also triggered a flurry of discussion on possible ethical ramifications of this sort of blood biomarker. I will not attempt to address these ethical issues specifically here. Rather, I seek to highlight that how ethically troubling one views the technology to be may depend partly on the sort of knowledge one thinks these biomarkers reveal (applied epistemology at its best).

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Limits of Technological Solutions to Moral Problems

By Matthew L Baum

In my last blog post, I suggested that we consider incentivizing scientists and engineers to develop technologies that side-step ethical dilemmas entangling certain current technologies. I highlighted that these morally modifying technologies 1) neither resolve a moral debate nor do they take a side, 2) usually do not function empirically better than existing technology, and 3) make a moral dilemma less practically problematic by providing a technological work-around. I highlighted induced pluripotent stem cells, blood recirculators, and fixed-time ventilators as three examples of morally modifying technologies. But when is it a bad idea to encourage the development of morally modifying technologies?

In response to an excellent comment on that post by Joanna Sax, I would like to extend my initial description of technological solutions to moral problems to a discussion of their limits and the potential problems that might accompany them. I will begin here with the three externalities Joanna suggested and start a discussion on how they might be avoided.

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TOMORROW: Frances Kamm’s Bioethical Prescriptions: Book Talk and Panel Discussion

Please join us on February 27 at 2:00pm in Wasserstein 1019 at the Harvard Law School as we launch Professor Frances Kamm’s latest book, Bioethical Prescriptions: To Create, End, Choose, and Improve Lives (Oxford University Press, January 2014). The book showcases Professor Kamm’s articles on bioethics as parts of a coherent whole, with sections devoted to death and dying; early life (on conception and use of embryos, abortion, and childhood); genetics and other enhancements (on cloning and other genetic technologies); allocating scarce resources; and methodology (on the relation of moral theory and practical ethics).

Panelists include:

  • Frances Kamm, Littauer Professor of Philosophy & Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School of Government; Professor of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts & Sciences, Harvard University; Former Senior Fellow, Petrie-Flom Center
  • Norman Daniels, Mary B. Saltonstall Professor of Population Ethics and Professor of Ethics and Population Health, Harvard School of Public Health
  • Thomas (Tim) Scanlon, Jr., Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity, Faculty of Arts & Sciences, Harvard University
  • Moderator: Christopher T. Robertson, Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; Associate Professor, James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona

This event is free and open to the public. For questions, please contact petrie-flom@law.harvard.edu or 617-496-4662.

Sponsored by the Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and BioethicsEdmond J. Safra Center for Ethics at Harvard University; and the Countway Library of Medicine at Harvard Medical School; with support from the Oswald DeN. Cammann Fund.

Public Lecture at Radcliffe Institute “The Ethicist’s and The Lawyer’s New Clothes: The Law and the Ethics of Smart Clothes” now Available on Youtube

As part of a public lecture series at the Radcliffe Institute on “Smart Clothes” I delivered a public lecture entitled “The Ethicist’s and the Lawyer’s New Clothes: The Law and Ethics of Smart Clothes.” The lecture is now available for viewing on youtube. As the promotional materials described the lecture: “From enhanced exosuits for members of the armed services to clothing that spies on you, I. Glenn Cohen focuses on legal and ethical issues pertaining to the future of smart clothes.” While CNN coverage of the lecture focused on the surveillance aspects of these clothes, I think the discussion of exosuits and enhancements may be more interesting to BOH readers.

2/27: Frances Kamm’s Bioethical Prescriptions: Book Talk and Panel Discussion

Please join us on February 27 at 2:00pm in Wasserstein 1019 at the Harvard Law School as we launch Professor Frances Kamm’s latest book, Bioethical Prescriptions: To Create, End, Choose, and Improve Lives (Oxford University Press, January 2014). The book showcases Professor Kamm’s articles on bioethics as parts of a coherent whole, with sections devoted to death and dying; early life (on conception and use of embryos, abortion, and childhood); genetics and other enhancements (on cloning and other genetic technologies); allocating scarce resources; and methodology (on the relation of moral theory and practical ethics).

Panelists include:

  • Frances Kamm, Littauer Professor of Philosophy & Public Policy, Harvard Kennedy School of Government; Professor of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts & Sciences, Harvard University; Former Senior Fellow, Petrie-Flom Center
  • Norman Daniels, Mary B. Saltonstall Professor of Population Ethics and Professor of Ethics and Population Health, Harvard School of Public Health
  • Thomas (Tim) Scanlon, Jr., Alford Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity, Faculty of Arts & Sciences, Harvard University
  • Moderator: Christopher T. Robertson, Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; Associate Professor, James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona

This event is free and open to the public. For questions, please contact petrie-flom@law.harvard.edu or 617-496-4662.

Sponsored by the Petrie-Flom Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology, and Bioethics; Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics at Harvard University; and the Countway Library of Medicine at Harvard Medical School; with support from the Oswald DeN. Cammann Fund.

Prioritizing Parks and Patients

By Nathaniel Counts

During the government shutdown in October 2013, a battle in part over the future of healthcare reform, a non-negligible amount of media attention focused on the shutdown of public parks.  Perhaps because the parks were the least expected casualty of the shutdown, or the most ludicrous – many are, after all, large outdoor spaces that functioned for millions of years before there were federal funds for them – Americans were frustrated or amused that they could not walk around outside some places because politicians in D.C. could not agree on a budget.

The healthcare reform debate pitted those who believed that everyone should have health insurance or that access to healthcare was a right against those who believed that health spending was already too high or that everyone does not have a right to access to healthcare.  In a world of infinite resources, where everyone could have complete access to healthcare without anyone having to give up anything of their own, it is difficult to imagine that anyone would say that there should not be universal access to healthcare, that some are not deserving of the service.  It would be strange to require a threshold public showing of effort to obtain health insurance through employment if there was no cost to giving the healthcare – if fairness is an issue, as it appears to be a concern for some, there are certainly other services that could be denied.  It is likely that for most the fairness concern only becomes salient in the face of resource constraints where these same funds could fund other programs or allow others to pursue their interests.

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Now Available: Bioethical Prescriptions by Frances M. Kamm

Bioethical Prescriptions: To Create, End, Choose, and Improve Lives

By Frances M. Kamm, Littauer Professor of Philosophy and Public Policy at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, Professor of Philosophy in the Harvard University Faculty of Arts and Sciences, and Petrie-Flom Academic Fellow alumna

This book is a collection of Frances M. Kamm‘s articles on bioethics, which have appeared over the last twenty-five years and which have made her among the most influential philosophers in this area. Kamm is known for her intricate, sophisticated, and painstaking philosophical analyses of moral problems generally and of bioethical issues in particular. This volume showcases these articles – revised to eliminate redundancies — as parts of a coherent whole. A substantive introduction identifies important themes than run through the articles. Section headings include Death and Dying; Early Life (on conception and use of embryos, abortion, and childhood); Genetics and Other Enhancements (on cloning and other genetic technologies); Allocating Scarce Resources; and Methodology (on the relation of moral theory and practical ethics).

Peter Singer on Animals and Ethics

Video of the lecture is now available online.

By Chloe Reichel

Last Friday, Princeton ethicist Peter Singer joined Petrie-Flom for a lecture on “Ethics and Animals: Where are we now?” Singer began his talk with a historical look back at various religious and philosophical views of the relationship between humans and animals. He traced the lineage of thought from the view of dominion, which entails the idea that man has been granted free reign over animals by God (first found in Genesis, and also espoused by Aristotle); to the notions developed by Thomas Aquinas and Immanuel Kant, who believed that abuse of animals was not itself morally problematic except to the extent that it may inculcate bad habits in those who practice it; to the early English Utilitarians, who recognized the capacity of animals to suffer; to Charles Darwin, whose groundbreaking theory of evolution muddied previous distinctions between human and non-human animals.

Singer went on to discuss modern views of proper animal treatment. He articulated the prevailing view that humans have some obligations to treat animals well and without cruelty, but that human interests exceed those of animals. Singer then laid out his main principle regarding the treatment of animals—that of equal consideration of interests. In other words, the interests of non-human animals should be considered equally with human interests. To favor human interests over animal interests is a speciesist stance, similar in nature to other –isms, like racism and sexism, and equally morally indefensible, in Singer’s view. Singer carefully noted that while equal consideration of interests would mandate better treatment of many animals, such as those raised as livestock, his principle does not imply that humans and animals should receive the same treatment.

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