EMTALA and Patient Hoarding

By Jeremy Kreisberg

It is clear that EMTALA aims to prevent hospitals from dumping patients that require emergency care until these patients are stabilized.  But whether EMTALA also prevents hospitals from hoarding emergency patients to their detriment is far less clear.  Recently, the Tenth Circuit confronted this question in Genova v. Banner Health, a case concerning a physician who claims that he was fired for complaining about overcrowding at his emergency room.  The physician sought protection under EMTALA’s whistleblower provisions, which prevent hospitals from taking an “adverse action” against an employee simply because that employee “report[ed] a violation of a requirement of [EMTALA].”  Thus, the question for the Tenth Circuit was whether a hospital violates EMTALA if it has an overcrowded emergency room and refuses to offer a transfer to its waiting patients.  Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Gorsuch held that there was no such violation.

As a matter of statutory purpose, the Tenth Circuit had a persuasive case.  After all, EMTALA is clearly intended to prevent hospitals from dumping its emergency patients onto other hospitals to avoid the costs of providing uncompensated care.  So when Dr. Genova complained about “patient hoarding” rather than “patient dumping,” the court cleverly stated that “[h]is complaint wasn’t about an EMTALA violation but more nearly its inverse.”  Indeed, there are serious potential issues with finding that EMTALA requires any overcrowded hospital to transfer its patients.  Such a rule might allow hospitals, which are often overcrowded, to use resource constraints as an excuse for transferring patients that require expensive care.

But the Tenth Circuit rested much of its case on the statutory text.  And as a matter of statutory interpretation, this issue is far from clear.  EMTALA states that a hospital which receives a patient “must provide for an appropriate medical screening examination within the capability of the hospital’s emergency department.”  If a patient has an “emergency medical condition,” the hospital must provide either (A) “within the staff and facilities available at the hospital, for such further medical examination and such treatment as may be required to stabilize the medical condition,” or (B) “for transfer of the individual to another medical facility in accordance with subsection (c) of [EMTALA].”

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Disabilities and Behavioral Disorders

By Nathaniel Counts

The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) and related statutes and regulations creates a cause of action that allows children and young adults with disabilities to be able to participate equally in public schools and universities.  “Disability” can include behavioral and other mental health disorders, such as depression, anxiety disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, phobias, or conduct disorder, to the extent that it interferes with the child’s ability to thrive at school.  Over the period of any individual’s school-going career, quite a few people might be considered disabled under the law.

Actual prevalence of behavioral disorders is of course very difficult to measure, but the prevalence in young children for serious emotional disturbances, behavioral disorders that substantially impair a child’s ability to participate in school, has been most frequently estimated at between 10% and 20% as of 2006, and the prevalence for behavioral disorders that do not rise to the level of serious emotional disturbances is likely somewhat higher.  For college students in 2012, one study found that about 30% of students reported feeling so depressed within the past 12 months that it was difficult to function and about 20% of the students reported being diagnosed or receiving treatment for some type of mental health disorder within the past 12 months.  Even given these limited statistics, it is evident that a significant percentage of the population is currently affected by, or will be affected at some point in their lifetime by, a behavioral disorder and that a sizable proportion of these individuals would likely benefit from some form of services or accommodation in their schooling.

The prevalence of behavioral disorders begs the question: what if the majority of the population experiences some form of behavioral disorder?

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Big Data Proxies and Health Privacy Exceptionalism

By Nicolas Terry

I have posted Big Data Proxies and Health Privacy Exceptionalism. The article argues that, while “small data” rules protect conventional health care data (doing so exceptionally, if not exceptionally well), big data facilitates the creation of health data proxies that are relatively unprotected. As a result, the carefully constructed, appropriate, and necessary model of health data privacy will be eroded. Proxy data created outside the traditional space protected by extant health privacy models will end exceptionalism, reducing data protection to the very low levels applied to most other types of data. The article examines big data and its relationship with health care, including the data pools in play, and pays particular attention to three types of big data that lead to health proxies: “laundered” HIPAA data, patient-curated data, and medically-inflected data. It then reexamines health privacy exceptionalism across legislative and regulatory domains seeking to understand its level of “stickiness” when faced with big data. Finally the article examines some of the claims for big data in the health care space, taking the position that while increased data liquidity and big data processing may be good for health care they are less likely to benefit health privacy.

Art Caplan: Prayer no substitute for vaccination

Art Caplan has a new opinion piece up at nbcnews.com on a recent outbreak of measles centered around a church in Newark, Texas. From the piece:

The congregation of Eagle Mountain International Church in Newark, Texas, recently discovered that prayer is no substitute for vaccination.

After visiting Indonesia, an unidentified visitor to the megachurch 50 miles outside Dallas — where ministers have long favored faith-healing over vaccinations — infected at least 21 people in the church and neighboring towns with measles. One victim was a 4-month old baby too young to receive a vaccination and thus totally dependent on others to do so.

Confronted with the measles outbreak, church leaders changed their tune, launched a vaccination drive, hosted vaccination clinics and encouraged the entire congregation to get immunized. The Old Testament is “full of precautionary measures,” senior pastor Terri Pearsons said after the mini-epidemic.

Theological revelation aside, Pearsons and other church leaders should have thought about this sooner. They and other vaccine resisters — from wealthy suburbanites who worry about the dangers they’ve heard from celebrities to conspiracy theorists who see only corporate profits driving a push to cover-up risks — are directly to blame for spreading unwarranted fear of vaccines.

Read the full article here.

Faculty Fellowships in Public Health Law – Call for Applications

Applications are invited for 10 faculty fellowships in public health law education.

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Georgia State University College of Law and its Center for Law, Health & Society are leading an initiative funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation for a faculty fellowship program to promote public health law education. Ten faculty members from law schools or schools/programs of public health will be selected to participate in a yearlong fellowship program designed to foster innovations in educational programming (including clinical, externship, and other experiential learning) and to build a strong learning community among faculty who teach in the public health law field.

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Bypassing Damage Caps

By Alex Stein

Damage caps are widespread. A typical cap provision precludes medical malpractice victims from recovering more than a specified sum for pain, suffering and other noneconomic harms. These caps vary between $250,000 (as in California that might soon increase its cap by a referendum) and a $1,500,000-$500,000 scale (as in Florida). Some state supreme courts (e.g., Georgia, Illinois, and Wisconsin) voided the caps as unconstitutional, but many others (e.g., Alaska, California, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Ohio and West Virginia) have upheld their constitutionality. In a few states (e.g., Florida and Texas), statutory caps had to be corrected to secure their alignment with state constitutions.

Damage caps are controversial.  Some people believe that they help contain the costs and secure the affordability of medical care. Others believe that caps shortchange malpractice victims and weaken the deterrence of malpractitioners. People falling into the first group generally support tort reforms. People falling into the second group ardently oppose those reforms. For my middle-way position—that supports procedural tort reforms that block away unsubstantiated malpractice suits, while opposing damage caps and other substantive tort reformssee here.

The plaintiffs bar expectedly tries to bypass the caps: see Catherine Sharkey’s important article that identifies the “crossover” dynamic: Facing caps on their clients’ noneconomic recovery, patients’ attorneys boost and vigorously pursue their clients’ claims for economic damages with the jurors’ blessing and approval.

Another, relatively recent, way of bypassing the cap is splitting the “occurrence” or “event” of medical malpractice into several events or occurrences. When successful, this strategy doubles, or more than doubles, the recoverable compensation amount. Read More

A year later, state powers remain vital after the ACA decision

By Theodore Ruger

Cross-posted from Constitution Daily.

Last summer, the Supreme Court put its money where its mouth was in terms of federalism doctrine in its landmark decision about the Affordable Care Act (ACA), inNFIB v. Sebelius.

512px-Obama_signs_health_care-20100323By upholding the ACA, with its myriad implementation choices delegated to the states, and by reconfiguring the Act to give states additional discretion over whether to expand their Medicaid programs, the Court did more in NFIB to advance the actual working realities of American federalism than did many of the leading federalism decisions of the prior two decades.

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