The Ill-Designed “Continuous Treatment” Rule for the Health Law of Massachusetts

By Alex Stein

Under Massachusetts law, suits alleging medical malpractice in a treatment of a minor patient must be filed “within three years from the date the cause of action accrues.” G.L.c. 231, § 60D. In a recent case, Parr v. Rosenthal, 57 N.E.3d 947 (Mass. 2016), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts decided that a patient’s continuous treatment by the same physician can toll this period under certain restrictive conditions. One of those conditions requires the plaintiff to show that the physician continued to treat the patient “for the same or related condition” after committing the alleged malpractice, and that “treatment” in that context includes supervision of, as well as consultation and advice to, other treating physicians. Another condition makes continuous treatment part of the discovery rule that moves the onset of the limitations period to the day on which the patient knew or could have reasonably suspected that her physician treated her negligently. According to the Court, continuous treatment instills in the patient “innocent reliance” that the physician treats her properly, which makes the physician’s malpractice not reasonably discoverable. Moreover, innocent reliance can even be present when the patient realizes that she sustained harm from the physician’s treatment. As the Court explained, “A patient who continues under the care of the same physician will still have the same challenges in learning whether the harm [she] suffered from the physician’s treatment arose from the physician’s negligence.” Based on these observations, the Court decided that the “continuous treatment” rule will not benefit patients who affirmatively suspected that they received negligent treatment from their physician. Such patients, the Court held, cannot show “innocent reliance.” Read More

Malpractice, Apologies and the Statute of Limitations in Federally Qualified Health Centers

By Alex Stein

Two months ago, the Seventh Circuit has delivered another important decision with regard to medical malpractice actions filed against federally qualified health centers. Blanche v. United States, 811 F.3d 953 (7th Cir. 2016). See also Arteaga v. United States, 711 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2013), and Sanchez v. United States, 740 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2014), discussed here.

Such actions can only be filed in federal courts pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), but patients and – worse – their attorneys are often unaware of this fact. As a result, by the time they properly file a suit, the FTCA’s two-year limitations period expires and the patient’s cause of action against the United States becomes time barred. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). I call this problem “FTCA’s Trap for the Unwary.” To salvage the suit, the patient can petition for equitable tolling, but her chances of being granted equitable tolling are slim (in courts that still interpret the FTCA’s limitations provision as jurisdictional, those chances do not even exist). Read More

Medical Malpractice in Reproductive-Choice Procedures

By Alex Stein

Malpractice suits filed in connection with reproductive-choice procedures often present unique problems. The suit filed by Jami Conner against her former gynecologist, Dr. Bryan Hodges, is a case in point. The plaintiff, a mother of two children, decided that she did not want to have more children. To avoid future pregnancy, she asked the defendant to perform bilateral ligation of her tubes and the defendant granted her wish. Two and a half years later, however, the plaintiff discovered that she was pregnant again. Her suit against the defendant promptly followed that discovery. Read More

Sebelius v. Auburn Regional Medical Center: Hospitals Allege Medicare Intentionally Underpaid Providers–And Got Away With It

By Katie Booth

In the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Auburn Regional Medical Center, the Court held that a suit against HHS by eighteen hospitals alleging intentional underpayment of Medicare reimbursements was barred by a 180-day internal agency deadline for appeals of reimbursement decisions. The rub is that the hospitals only found out about the underpayments, which allegedly occurred from 1987 to 1994, in March of 2006. These underpayments affected thousands of hospitals and added up to billions of dollars. Yet under Auburn, since the hospitals did not sue within 180 days of the underpayment (or even within an extended three-year window for “good cause”), they cannot recover. The Court in Auburn rejected the hospitals’ argument that equitable tolling should apply, finding instead that “the presumption in favor of equitable tolling does not apply to administrative appeals of the kind here at issue.”

The Auburn decision raises important questions about the ability of the federal government to intentionally underpay healthcare providers. In oral argument, the lawyer for the hospitals characterized HHS’s actions as “intentional concealment . . . [and] misconduct by the Secretary, that caused the statute of limitations time to be missed.” While there are good reasons not to disturb decades-old reimbursement decisions, it is sobering that the federal government can intentionally conceal underpayments and—if it conceals the underpayment for only 180 days—never have to reimburse the injured party. This situation presents a striking contrast “to 42 CFR § 405.1885(b)(3) (2012), which permits reopening of an intermediary’s reimbursement determination ‘at any time if it is established that such determination . . . was procured by fraud or similar fault of any party to the determination.’” In other words, HHS can reopen reimbursement decisions if a provider intentionally conceals important information, but not vice versa.

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