By Rossella De Falco
Strong, well-coordinated and resilient public health care services play a vital role in preventing and responding to public health crises. Under international human rights law, States have a positive, primary obligation to ensure that such health care services are of the highest possible quality and accessible to everyone, everywhere, and without discrimination.
By Calvin Wai-Loon Ho
With the mainstreaming of digital technology across many spheres of social life, infodemic management must be an integral part of public health emergency prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery.
While the Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Public Health Emergencies (the Principles) do not make explicit reference to infodemics, the application of digital technologies in response to a public health emergency is a clear concern. This article provides further elaboration and critique of the Principles and their treatment of this emergent phenomenon.
By Kayum Ahmed, Julia Bleckner, and Kyle Knight
In mid-May, the World Health Organization officially declared the “emergency” phase of the COVID-19 pandemic over. However, the deep wounds of the pandemic remain, compelling those concerned about this pandemic and future health emergencies to account for catastrophic failures by those in power. These reflections suggest that the public health crisis could have been addressed differently, both reducing COVID-19’s unprecedented magnitude of illness and death, and preserving human dignity.
The COVID-19 pandemic isn’t over, and the end of this pandemic’s emergency phase certainly doesn’t mean we accept the widely abysmal response as the model for the world’s reaction to the next one. Public health emergencies aren’t entirely preventable. We live in a complex world where health is increasingly affected by a changing climate, extraordinary levels of pollution, and inadequate preventive and responsive health services. Emergencies will happen. But when they do, responses that uphold human rights need to be the norm.
By Roojin Habibi, Timothy Fish Hodgson, and Alicia Ely Yamin
Today, as the world transitions from living in the grips of a novel coronavirus to living with an entrenched, widespread infectious disease known as COVID-19, global appreciation for the human rights implications of public health crises are once again rapidly fading from view.
Against the backdrop of this burgeoning collective amnesia, a project to articulate the human rights norms relevant to public health emergencies led to the development of the 2023 Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights and Public Health Emergencies (the Principles).
This symposium gathers reflections from leading scholars, activists, jurists, and others from around the world with respect to the recently issued Principles.
This post was originally published on the Verfassungsblog as part of our joint symposium on international pandemic lawmaking.
By Ilja Richard Pavone
The COVID-19 pandemic has raised unprecedented challenges for the global health framework and its long-term consequences are not yet in full sight. The legal and institutional regime aimed at preventing and controlling the spread of infectious diseases, grounded on the International Health Regulations (IHR) was heavily criticized.
The alarm mechanism based on the declaration of Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), in particular, has been severely tested. A PHEIC is an extraordinary event that constitutes a potential public health risk through the international spread of a disease outbreak. The WHO Director-General bases his decision to “ring the bell” upon the technical advice of an Emergency Committee (EC) carrying out “an assessment of the risk to human health, of the risk of international spread, and of the risk of interference with international traffic.”
A PHEIC, then, is declared only when an event is already sufficiently acute and has started to spread internationally. It is not an early warning, but a formal alert, and in the case of COVID-19 it was issued with extreme delay only on 30 January 2020, (one month after notification of early cases by the Chinese government), after Beijing had already adopted quarantine measures around the city of Wuhan, and draconian measures to curb the spread of the disease in the country had been announced.
This post was originally published on the Verfassungsblog as part of our joint symposium on international pandemic lawmaking.
By Raphael Oidtmann
The COVID-19 pandemic has (yet again) disclosed that, in contemporary international law, the notion of borders resembles a distinct emanation of legal fiction, i.e., “something assumed in law to be fact irrespective of the truth or accuracy of that assumption.” This characterization of international borders holds particularly true with a view towards managing, containing, and countering the spread of highly contagious pathogens: especially in the context of responding to the global COVID-19 pandemic, it has hence become apparent that the traditional conception of borders as physical frontiers has been rendered somewhat moot. On the contrary, the pandemic experience has proven that a more flexible, fluid, and functional understanding of (international) borders might be warranted, also with a view towards (re-)conceptualizing international health law.
This post was originally published on the Verfassungsblog as part of our joint symposium on international pandemic lawmaking.
By Sara (Meg) Davis, Mike Podmore, and Courtenay Howe
What should the role of those most affected by pandemics be in future pandemic governance and co-ordination mechanisms?
Drawing on human rights standards and principles, and on existing structures in the HIV, TB and malaria sectors, we argue that the human right to participation should extend to permanent seats and votes for civil society and affected communities on governance boards.* Our argument is informed by an analysis by STOPAIDS, Aidsfonds, CSSN and Frontline AIDS, by consultations led by STOPAIDS, and by the examples of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria (“the Global Fund”), Unitaid, and the Access to Covid Technologies-Accelerator (ACT-A).
This post was originally published on the Verfassungsblog as part of our joint symposium on international pandemic lawmaking.
By Sharon Bassan
Piecemeal and fragmented policymaking during COVID-19 underscored the need for an equity-focused global health agenda. Several international health law mechanisms, such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) and “soft law” frameworks, try to bring together relevant stakeholders to the table, help ensure international sharing of medical information, and facilitate equitable distribution of the benefits of research in developing vaccines and therapeutics. Nevertheless, their application during COVID-19 did not result in an effective global governance. Most responses were nationally-focused, lacked global commitment and solidarity, failed to notify the WHO of novel outbreaks, and were non-compliant with its professional recommendations.
Many agree that the solution should be multileveled and structural — a result of the connection and cooperation between participants. The prism of the “shared responsibility model” provides an interesting opportunity to consider potential global health governance models for emergency actions. My refined version of the model is based on Iris Young and Christian Barry’s suggested models, and includes two pairs of parameters, engaging and assigning. Engaging parameters locate the involved actors, and explain why they are assigned responsibilities. Assigning parameters address the type of duties each actor bears, and the site where they are expected to take action.
This post was originally published on the Verfassungsblog as part of our joint symposium on international pandemic lawmaking.
By Paul Ogendi
Tackling the question of how to address the needs for sharing scientific research, pooling technology, and know-how in diagnostics, therapeutics, and potential vaccines in future epidemics is fundamental to any pandemic treaty discussion. Moreover, we also need to consider how such a treaty might address potential conflicts with the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement.
First of all, market-based solutions do not work in the context of global pandemics as has been demonstrated in the COVID-19 pandemic that is currently ravaging the world. Market-based solutions demand putting too much faith in the private sector, both in terms of capacity (supply chains, etc.) and in terms of equity. By relying on the private sector in the context of COVID-19, many countries are struggling to secure adequate personal protective equipment, testing kits, and more importantly life-saving vaccines.
This post was originally published on the Verfassungsblog as part of our joint symposium on international pandemic lawmaking.
By Ciara Staunton and Deborah Mascalzoni
COVID-19 demonstrated the interconnectedness of the world and that our collective protection and well-being is contingent on our individual response. The importance of solidarity and acting in the public interest became key messages in public health, as too were these principles justified as the basis for data-sharing across borders. Accessing this data was critical and its timely access to this data was essential in research for the much-needed new vaccines.
Solidarity can be understood as the commitment to carry costs to assist others. In the same way that we were told to keep away from loved ones (the cost) to stop the spread of the virus (to assist others), individuals were encouraged to share their data with researchers and in turn researchers were encouraged to share their data with other researchers (the cost) to develop vaccines (to assist) for the global collective benefit (others). The response was remarkable. Data sharing became the default (the cost), vaccines were rapidly developed (to assist), but herein the solidarity pathway stopped. Access was (and still is) largely driven by national and private interests rather than the global collective benefit.