Tag: Medical Malpratice vs. Ordinary Negligence

Malpractice at the Front Desk

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By Alex Stein

Georgia’s Court of Appeals recently categorized a clinic’s front-desk person’s failure to communicate a patient’s complaints to the doctors as ordinary negligence rather than medical malpractice. Wong v. Chappell, 773 S.E.2d 496 (Ga.App. 2015).

This categorization has four important implications:

First, it allows an aggrieved patient to file her suit and proceed to trial without obtaining expert testimony and a preliminary affidavit (or certificate of merit) from a qualified physician.

Second, it frees plaintiffs from the stringent limitations and repose rules that apply in medical malpractice actions. Read More

“Medical Malpractice” vs. General Negligence: The Case of Falling Accidents

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By Alex Stein

As I wrote previously – see here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here – whether a tort action sounds in “medical malpractice” as opposed to general negligence, or vice versa, can be crucial. Suits sounding in “medical malpractice” must satisfy special requirements that include shortened limitations periods, statutes of repose, and expert affidavits (or certificates of merit) at filing. In many states, those suits are also subject to special damage caps. Suits sounding in general negligence are free from these constraints. Filing and prosecuting those suits is consequently not as onerous and expensive as filing and prosecuting medical malpractice actions. For that reason, we witness many disputes over this pivotal categorization issue. Read More

Suits for nursing-home neglects sound in general negligence rather than medical malpractice, and are consequently not subject to damage caps

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By Alex Stein

The West Virginia Supreme Court has recently delivered a super-important malpractice decision, Manor Care, Inc. v. Douglas, — S.E.2d —- (W. Va. 2014), holding that suits for nursing-home neglects sound in general negligence, rather than medical malpractice, and are consequently not subject to damage caps. This decision is very well reasoned and I expect it to be followed in other states that cap medical-malpractice damages.  Read More

Suits against labs sound in ordinary negligence rather than medical malpractice

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By Alex Stein

Last week, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island decided that suit against a lab for failure to identify illness or genetic disorder sounds in ordinary negligence and not in medical malpractice.  Ho–Rath v. Rhode Island Hospital, — A.3d —-, 2014 WL 1765421 (R.I. 2014). The “ordinary negligence” sound is music to the plaintiffs’ ears: it exempts them from statutory caps on damages, from the restrictive limitations and repose provisions, from demanding requirements for expert testimony, and from other procedural burdens. See here.

This ruling was based on Rhode Island’s statutory definition of healthcare provider. The Court held that this definition excludes labs because they do not treat patients and have a separate licensing system. In the case at hand, the Court’s ruling enabled the plaintiffs to toll the statute of limitations by invoking the broad undiscoverability exception not available in suits for medical malpractice.

Doctrinally, this precedent exposes labs to an increased prospect of tort liability, but I doubt that it will affect lab prices. The lab industry follows established protocols that minimize errors. Compliance with those protocols indicates adequate care that virtually guarantees the lab an immunity against suit. Also: the vast majority of lab errors result from mistakes made by clinicians and hospital administration. See here.