Linking entities.

A Shared Responsibility Model

This post was originally published on the Verfassungsblog as part of our joint symposium on international pandemic lawmaking.

By Sharon Bassan

Piecemeal and fragmented policymaking during COVID-19 underscored the need for an equity-focused global health agenda. Several international health law mechanisms, such as the International Health Regulations (IHR) and “soft law” frameworks, try to bring together relevant stakeholders to the table, help ensure international sharing of medical information, and facilitate equitable distribution of the benefits of research in developing vaccines and therapeutics. Nevertheless, their application during COVID-19 did not result in an effective global governance. Most responses were nationally-focused, lacked global commitment and solidarity, failed to notify the WHO of novel outbreaks, and were non-compliant with its professional recommendations.

Many agree that the solution should be multileveled and structural­ — a result of the connection and cooperation between participants. The prism of the “shared responsibility model” provides an interesting opportunity to consider potential global health governance models for emergency actions. My refined version of the model is based on Iris Young and Christian Barry’s suggested models, and includes two pairs of parameters, engaging and assigning. Engaging parameters locate the involved actors, and explain why they are assigned responsibilities. Assigning parameters address the type of duties each actor bears, and the site where they are expected to take action.

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carrot dangling on a string.

International Pandemic Lawmaking: Some Perspectives from Behavioral Economics

This post was originally published on the Verfassungsblog as part of our joint symposium on international pandemic lawmaking.

By Anne Van Aaken and Tomer Broude

In this brief essay, we wish to highlight some insights from behavioral economics that can contribute to a successful process of international pandemic lawmaking. Our interest here is not to engage with individual or collective psychological reactions to pandemics or other large-scale risks, or with substantive policy made in their wake. Several such behavioral issues and dimensions have been dealt with elsewhere, not without (ongoing) spirited debate. For example, the utility of simple reminders to get vaccinated as individual “nudges,” contrasting with enforced vaccination is a continuing issue. Indeed, the WHO is addressing such approaches through the Technical Advisory Group on Behavioural Insights and Sciences for Health, in accordance with general UN behavioral science policy. Similarly, elite decision-makers’ tendencies towards procrastination and omission bias in the face of high degrees of uncertainty, on both national and international levels have arguably negatively impacted large-scale policies with respect to COVID-19. Understanding these and other behavioral dynamics may be crucial in determining the substantive content of a cooperative pandemic regime. Here, however, while building on related frameworks of analysis from the field of behavioral economics, as applied to international law (including nudge theory), our focus is on the process and design of pandemic international law-making.

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